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Toward Healing and Restoration for All:
Reframing Medical Malpractice Reform
JONATHAN TODRES
The medical malpractice liability system is blamed for everything from
the high cost of health care to quality assurance issues. This Article
suggests that one of the problems with the current approach to medical
malpractice is that legal remedies for medical error are not viewed as part
of the continuum of care, and that answers to the recurrent medical
malpractice crises may lie in health care's core values. Thus, a new
model--driven by the principle of care and the goal of healing-is needed
to address medical errors more effectively. Building from these core
principles of care and healing, this Article develops a new healing-
centered framework which provides a better assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of the current medical malpractice liability system and
existing alternative schemes. Evaluating existing options using this new
framework, the Article finds that each of the current models falls short in
important ways. The Article then turns to restorative justice for guidance
in fashioning an alternative system for addressing medical error that meets
the objectives of the healing-centered framework. Building on restorative
justice principles, this Article proposes a restorative medical error
resolution scheme aimed at providing healing for patients, healthcare
providers and the community.
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Toward Healing and Restoration for All:
Reframing Medical Malpractice Reform
JONATHAN TODRES
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. health care system is considered so burdened with problems
that it has been deemed "a $1.3 trillion per year fiasco."' In fact, many
experts suggest that the practice of medicine in the United States has been
in "crisis" since at least the early .1960s.2 The finger pointing is often
directed at the medical malpractice liability system, which bears the blame
for everything from the high cost of health care to quality assurance issues.
Over the years, Congress and many state legislatures have deliberated over,
and in some cases adopted, measures to reform medical malpractice
litigation in an effort to reduce the number of claims brought against
doctors, limit the size of awards to patient-plaintiffs, and control the rising
costs of medical malpractice insurance premiums.3  Questions persist
whether these efforts are ultimately the best way of achieving a top quality
health care delivery system with a safety net for those injured during the
course of treatment.
This Article suggests that current medical malpractice reform efforts
are deficient because they consider remedies for medical errors as being
separate from the health care system. Thus, the core principle-care-and
Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. Professor Todres has also
taught Law & Medicine at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I am grateful
to Professors Carol Liebman, Theodore Marmot, Kathryn Zeiler, Sylvia Law, Mark Geistfeld, Jennifer
Arlen, Oscar Chase, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, David Gans, Meredith Johnson Harbach and the NYU
Lawyering Faculty Workshop participants for their helpful comments and suggestions, and to my
research assistants Chant's Parker and Elizabeth W. Sepper for their excellent work.
IJ.D. KLEINKE, OXYMORONS: THE MYTH OF A U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2001). See also
Andrea Gerlin, Health Care's Deadly Secret: Accidents Routinely Happen, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 12,
1999, at Al (reporting that health care deaths compare unfavorably to airplane crash deaths). In fact,
an American NGO-Health Care Problems-catalogs problems identified by patients, health care
professionals, insurance companies, attorneys, and others. See The Health Care Problems Archive,
www.healthcareproblems.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
2 See generally THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE (Marion K. Sanders ed., 1961). For more
recent reports on the medical malpractice "crisis," see Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are
Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 515, 515 (2005) ("The United States is in its fifth year of what is now widely referred to as 'the
new medical malpractice crisis."'); Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl The Use
of Voluntary Caps on Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 703, 704
(2005) ("Again we find ourselves in a medical malpractice crisis."); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical
Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, W4 HEALTH AFF. 20 (Jan.
21, 2004), http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives.php (follow "Web index pages" hyperlink; then
follow Web Exclusives "2004" hyperlink) (reporting that the United States is in the midst of its third
medical malpractice crisis).
3 See William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice
Premiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 484-92 (2004).
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the primary goal-healing--of health care are not properly taken into
account when devising a system to address medical errors.4 Consequently,
the medico-legal community needs a new framework for reform that is
care-based and serves the goal of providing healing and restoration for
patients, healthcare providers, and the community.
Today, legal remedies for medical errors are not considered part of the
continuum of care. If something goes wrong during patient treatment, the
typical response is to call in the attorneys. Lawyers take over, and the
patient's problem is no longer seen as situated in the health care system;
rather, it is under the auspices of the legal system. The focus then shifts to
limiting information flow, stating one's case, making the better argument,
and proving the other party wrong. Very little in this endeavor fosters an
environment of care, and no part of it readily leads to healing.
Yet, the essence of health care is a care relationship aimed at providing
healing for the patient. The fact that a patient is injured as a result of
medical intervention should not mean that these core values are
abandoned. Redress for medical malpractice should be part of the
continuum of care in the health care delivery system, incorporating into its
processes medicine's goals of alleviating suffering and providing healing.
By adopting a healing-centered approach to medical malpractice, the legal
system can provide healing to patients, healthcare providers, and the
broader community.
To date, political debates over medical malpractice reform have
narrowly-and at times incorrectly--construed the issues (e.g., excessive
jury awards) and, as a result, developed limited stopgap measures (e.g.,
caps on non-economic damages), instead of addressing the underlying
problems entrenched in the current medical malpractice litigation system.
Scholarly debates over the medical malpractice liability system have
4 The medical profession has used various terms, often inconsistently, to describe the events that
result in bad outcomes, leading to confusion. Compare INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 36 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (using "medical error" to
include any technical error, misdiagnosis, failure to prevent injury, or medication error) [hereinafter
IOM REPORT], with LOUIS HARRIS ET AL., NAT'L PATIENT SAFETY FOUND. AT THE AMA, PUBLIC
OPINION OF PATIENT SAFETY ISSUES RESEARCH FINDINGS 30 (1997), available at http://www.npsf.org
download/1997survey.pdf (viewing "medical mistakes" as covering the following: misdiagnosis,
medication error, medical procedure error, administrative error, communication error, incorrect
laboratory results, equipment malfunction, and other errors).
In this Article, I use the term "medical error" to refer to any individual or systems error. As such,
this Article focuses on "preventable adverse events" that result from any such medical error-an
"adverse event" being "an injury that was caused by medical management rather than the patient's
underlying disease." These definitions track that of the American Society of Healthcare Risk
Management used by the Harvard Hospitals. See MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR THE PREVENTION
OF MEDICAL ERRORS, WHEN THINGS Go WRONG: RESPONDING TO ADVERSE EVENTS: A CONSENSUS
STATEMENT OF THE HARVARD HOSPITALS 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter HARVARD HOSPITALS STATEMENT].
"Bad outcome" cases, in which no medical error occurred but a suboptimal outcome resulted, are not
the focus of this Article, though I believe that the R-MER system described herein has value even for
patients who experience a bad outcome that is not the result of any error. For more on definitional
issues, see JOHN D. BANJA, MEDICAL ERRORS AND MEDICAL NARCISSISM 1, 4-7 (2005).
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questioned whether tort law is the best mechanism for addressing medical
error, or whether contract-based or administrative (e.g., no-fault) models
would produce better results.5 This Article suggests a different starting
point, arguing for refocusing on medicine's core values, with a view to
utilizing them as the basis for a new framework to better serve the needs of
all parties affected by medical error. In other words, the medico-legal
community must first rethink the objectives of the medical malpractice
liability system before moving to consider various reform proposals. With
a clearer understanding of our objectives, we can better determine the most
effective approach to achieving our stated goals, whether that is tort law or
another legal model.
By using health care's core values as the foundation for a new
framework, the medico-legal community will position itself to develop a
system that effectively addresses not only medical errors, but also quality
of care, patient compensation, and a host of other issues that plague the
current system. Thus, in Part II, this Article begins by returning the focus
to the fundamental principles and goals of medicine. These core values
can inform our approach to remedying medical error, and I draw upon
these values to develop a "healing-centered framework" for evaluating
medical malpractice reform measures. I posit that the healing-centered
framework produces a set of objectives for medical malpractice liability
systems that, if fulfilled, would benefit patients, healthcare providers, and
the broader community. These goals, though similar to the goals of
traditional torts models, demand a focus that differs in a number of
important respects from some of the traditional aims of the tort system.
6
Specifically, the healing-centered framework establishes five objectives for
a medical malpractice liability system: (1) patient compensation; (2) safety
promotion (or error reduction); (3) harm reduction; (4) information
exchange; and (5) restorative opportunities for all parties. These objectives
5 See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 17-18 (1991) (describing four models:
tort liability, contractual agreement, administrative no-fault compensation, and social insurance);
Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care
Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1932 (2003) (supporting a tort-based model because
"contracts and market forces are not sufficient to ensure optimal care"); Richard A. Epstein, Medical
Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 91, 93-94 (1976) (articulating a
contract-based approach).
6 Medical malpractice law is typically described as having two aims: compensation of patients
injured by medical errors and deterrence of negligent behavior by health care providers. See, e.g.,
SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 1 (1978); Allen
Kachalia et al., Physician Responses to the Malpractice Crisis: From Defense to Offense, 33 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 416,417 (2005); Douglas W. Taylor, Assessment and'Planfor Medical Malpractice: Quality
Improvement Through Mediation, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 343, 345 (2003). As a tort law model,
medical malpractice law theoretically should achieve other traditional torts goals, including punishing
wrongdoing, determining appropriate standards of conduct, and internalizing costs of accidents to those
responsible.
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go beyond the traditional objectives of medical malpractice law, which
primarily emphasizes just compensation and deterrence. Employing the
healing-centered framework will help reorient the medical malpractice
reform debate toward a set of results that addresses the needs of all parties.
After establishing a new framework, this Article evaluates the merits
of current available means of dealing with medical errors. Using the
healing-centered framework as the basis for this analysis, in Part III we see
that the traditional medical malpractice liability system fails to provide
sufficient healing opportunities for all participants. Part IV then evaluates
proposed reforms and existing alternative models through the lens of the
healing-centered framework, finding deficiencies in each of these
approaches. The healing-centered framework not only provides a
systematic approach for evaluating models that attempt to address medical
error, but can also help in guiding the development of a better alternative
model.
Finding that no current option fulfills all goals of the healing-centered
framework, I turn in Part V to the task of determining how to reform the
current system to achieve the goals of the healing-centered framework. In
doing so, I draw upon the principles of restorative justice for guidance in
developing a new approach to medical malpractice. A healing-centered
approach to medical malpractice would parallel, in many respects,
restorative justice's response to retributive justice systems. Restorative
justice rejects retributive justice's focus on punishment, striving instead for
resolutions that provide healing for the victim, offender, and community.'
Restorative justice presents a model for addressing medical errors that
attends to the needs of patients, physicians, and the community.
Concentrating primarily on patients, physicians and the community is not a
suggestion that the other key players in health care-including nurses and
other healthcare providers, hospitals, nursing homes, and insurance
companies-are not important; rather, viewing medical malpractice
through the healing-centered framework requires giving priority to the
physician-patient care relationship.8 Other key players, such as hospitals
and managed care organizations, are not ignored. To do so would be
foolhardy. Yet these entities, while important, are not the reason for health
care, but rather are entities created to help optimize the performance of the
health care delivery system. Accordingly, the healing-centered framework
focuses primarily on patients, doctors (as well as other healthcare
providers) and the community.9
7 See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
8 While discussions herein of healthcare providers focus primarily on physicians, many of the
experiences and implications discussed apply similarly to nurses and other providers, and any R-MER
model should consider their needs and roles as well.
9 Much of the literature on medical malpractice reform focuses on doctors, hospitals, and
insurance companies, but gives little attention to the impact of reform on patients and the community.
In contrast, restorative approaches to medicine require primacy of the patient and community, in
[Vol. 39:667
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In exploring restorative justice, this Article examines the experiences
of truth commissions in addressing human rights violations. While truth
commissions address a starkly different set of problems, they offer
important lessons for creating systems that facilitate healing for all. In
fact, truth and reconciliation commissions, such as the one in South Africa,
have fostered healing in the context of some of the most horrific crimes
known to humanity. Their capacity to enable healing in the context of
torture and other grave human rights abuses suggests that healing is also
possible in the context of a physician-patient care relationship that has
been damaged by medical error. Building on restorative justice principles,
in Part VI, I propose a restorative medical error resolution (R-MER,
pronounced "armor") system that meets the objectives of the healing-
centered framework. I then propose a model for an R-MER system. This
model-a Truth-in-Medicine (TIM) Commission-suggests one way in
which an R-MER scheme can play out in practice to ensure healing and
restoration for patients, healthcare providers, and communities.' °
II. THE CORE GOALS AND PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL CARE
A. Health Care's Foundational Values
Each time health care finds itself in a medical malpractice crisis,
legislators push for reforms that address only certain symptoms of an ailing
medical malpractice litigation system. This cycle is likely to repeat unless
the medico-legal community charts a different course. To avoid further
crises, I believe we must return to the core values of medicine and use
them as the basis for building a better system.
The history of the medical profession reveals a continued emphasis on
care and healing. "The obligation of physicians to relieve human suffering
stretches back into antiquity."" In taking the Hippocratic Oath, physicians
throughout the centuries have sworn to apply their skills for the "benefit of
the sick.' 12 Such a noble obligation led Erasmus, almost 500 years ago, to
addition to healthcare providers. For more on the role of insurance companies, see infra notes 305-06
and accompanying text.10 In outlining the TIM Commission, I do not intend to present a detailed plan that explains every
procedural and substantive aspect of this model. Doing that would require much more space than is
available in this Article. Rather, I offer the TIM Commission to provide a sense of what R-MER
models might look like in practice. See infra Part VI.B.
"ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 29 (2d ed. 2004).
See also JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL I (2d ed. 1986)
("Medicine is the science of preventing, palliating and healing illness. The practice ... can be traced
back to the origins of Middle Eastern and Oriental civilizations.").
12 Hippocratic Oath, in LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND
INTERPRETATION 2-3 (1943) (translated from Greek). The Hippocratic Oath is also available online at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oathclassical.html.
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author the essay In Praise of the Healing Arts, in which he marveled at the
power of the physician:
The special glory of the healing arts is self-sufficient and
recommends itself to mankind by its value and utility. ... Its
true and inborn greatness, its elevation which exceeds human
comprehension cannot fully be expressed in mortal words
.... Many sicknesses have such a power that death is the
sure fate of a patient if the doctor does not interfere
immediately.' 
3
Subsequently, societies maintained their high regard for the
physician's powers of healing. In 18th century Germany, doctors ranked
above knights. 14  In the early 19th century, Thomas Carlyle wrote that
"[t]he physician can abolish pain, relieve his fellow mortals from sickness.
He is indisputably usefullest of all men."' 5 How the mighty have fallen,
some might say. Despite the remarkable developments in medical care, the
power to heal is no longer treated with such reverence, and doctors are no
longer seen as all powerful.' 6 Yet today, physicians can cure patients of so
many more diseases than just a few decades ago, let alone centuries ago.
Despite this progress, patients today frequently question the expertise of
doctors, and skepticism abounds over the motives of health care
professionals. 17  That is not to say that the changes in perceptions of
doctors are altogether bad. Some of the traditional paternalistic approaches
of doctors negatively affected the patient experience, especially for
women,1 8 and having patients take more responsibility in their care can
contribute positively to their treatment.
While health care delivery has changed dramatically since the days of
Erasmus, the core values have not; today physicians (and hospitals) still
espouse as their primary goal "the best possible patient care" or "first-class
13 See JOHN GORDON FREYMANN, THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ITS GENESIS AND
TRAJECTORY 11 (1977) (quoting Desiderius Erasmus, In Praise of the Healing Arts, reprinted in 210 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1587, 1587-88 (1969)).
14id.
1i5d
16 See CASSELL, supra note 11, at 23 (noting, particularly, the significant changes that occurred
during the 1960s).
17 See id. (stating that the doctor-knows-best view has "virtually disappeared" and that patients
now "frequently believe themselves to be active partners in their care"); see also Timothy Hall,
Bargaining with Hippocrates: Managed Care and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. REV.
689, 695 (2003) ("Payment structures, such as capitation, bonuses and withholds, and provider
selection and retention based on economic criteria, all tend to cause physicians to consider economic
factors in their medical decisionmaking to an extent they would not under a pure fee-for-service
regime."); Arnold S. Relman, The Impact of Market Forces on the Physician-Patient Relationship, 87
J. ROYAL SOC'Y OF MED. 22, 22 (1994) ("[Plrofessionalism in medicine seems to be giving way to
entrepreneurialism.").
18 See, e.g., FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 11 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996);
Leslie Bender, Teaching Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Ethics and Law: A Review Essay, 61 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1251, 1260-61 (1993).
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patient care."' 19 These noble ideals have been joined by other goals in the
modem practice of medicine, foremost among them the education of
doctors and nurses and research. These other goals, however, are pursued
in furtherance of the ultimate aim of medicine--optimizing care and
healing of patients.
20
Even with the increasing commercialization and commoditization of
health care, medicine remains "fundamentally a moral enterprise because it
is devoted to the welfare of the persons it treats. Medicine is also primarily
therapeutic, a matter of helping those who cannot help themselves and who
are thereby critically vulnerable.",2' The goal of medicine remains "a right
and good healing action" for patients.22 Thus, while money and prestige
may play a larger role in modem medicine, writings on medicine
consistently return to the central idea of care being the foundational
principle and healing being the primary objective.
These attributes make health care different from other enterprises in
modem society, and make the physician-patient relationship unique as
well. The relationship is one that relies on trust and caring, with a view to
alleviating suffering and meeting the physical and mental health needs of
the patient. Professor Mark Hall explains that "[d]octor-patient
relationships are characterized by levels of intimacy, dependency, and
vulnerability that are matched or exceeded only by family relationships. 23
Professor Cassell emphasizes that it is "a healing relationship., 24 Despite
the profession's long-standing commitment to relieve suffering, "little
attention is explicitly given to the problem of suffering in medical
education, research, or practice. ' 25  While healthcare providers treat
physical symptoms, they often pay comparatively little attention to
patients' emotional suffering.
Similarly, the current medical malpractice litigation system pays little
attention to suffering. The highly contentious nature of medical
malpractice lawsuits frequently does nothing to address patient suffering.
In addition, as cases can languish in the courts for years, the suffering can
be prolonged. Too often in a medical malpractice action, all parties-the
injured patient, doctors and other health care professionals who provided
19 FREYMANN, supra note 13, at 226.20 Id. at 228.
21 CASSELL, supra note 11, at 26-27.
22 EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 10 (1988) (explaining that "healing involves more
than a cure" and includes not just physical, but also "psychological, social, [and] even spiritual
dimensions).
23 Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303, 303 (2005).
See also CASSELL, supra note 11, at 62.
24 CASSELL, supra note 11, at 65.251 d. at 29.
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care, and the community-suffer much more than they ought to. Care and
healing, therefore, must be center stage in any system that seeks to remedy
medical errors.
B. Developing a Healing-Centered Framework for Medical Malpractice
The preceding historical review reveals care to be the guiding principle
for medical treatment and healing its most important objective. These core
concepts, which form the foundation of the practice of medicine, should
guide the development of our system of responding to medical errors.
Building from these foundational principles with a view to identifying the
conditions necessary for successful medical practice that effectively
minimizes and addresses medical error, several important objectives
emerge. Therefore, I submit that a care-based, healing-centered approach
to medical error requires a medical error resolution system that: (1)
provides compensation to injured patients; (2) promotes safety; (3) reduces
harm (minimizes suffering); (4) fosters information exchange; and (5)
offers restorative opportunities for all parties (facilitates healing). These
five objectives form what I refer to as the "healing-centered framework."
A system that fulfills these five objectives will achieve more successful
outcomes for patients, healthcare providers, and communities, while also
satisfying other traditional aims of tort law, including efficient allocation
of costs.
26
Patient compensation remains an integral component under the
healing-centered framework. Patients injured as a result of substandard
care typically face significant costs in the form of hospital bills, lost wages,
and other economic hardships. They require monetary compensation to
help them through this difficult period of their lives. Effective
compensation includes (1) covering all individuals injured as a result of
medical error, and (2) ensuring appropriate compensation for each such
individual.
Second, safety promotion (or error reduction) addresses three
traditional tort law concerns-punishment of wrongdoing, deterrence, and
determination of standards of conduct-but does so with a different focus.
Traditional tort law models of punishment and deterrence effectively
consist of the stick without the carrot.27 As healing for all parties is
important, utilizing the threat of punishment as the primary means of
improving care seems fraught with risk.28 Too often, the traditional tort
26 See, e.g., LAW & POLAN, supra note 6, at I ("In the most general terms, the tort law allocates
the costs of losses resulting from human activity.").
27 See, e.g., Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 5, at 2005 (noting that the current system's incentive
structure provides doctors with little benefit from good outcomes, and thus does not properly
incentivize investment in improving expertise).
28 Similar concerns have been raised about traditional criminal justice models by proponents of
restorative justice. See RUTH ANN STRICKLAND, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 137 (2004) ("[T]he
punishment structure utilized in the traditional criminal justice system, with its focus on doling out just
[Vol. 39:667
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law approach to medical error results in doctors, hospitals, and HMOs
trying to avoid punishment, and thus engaging in practices aimed at
reducing risk rather than error.29 This approach, in turn, fails to foster the
conditions necessary for optimal development of standards of care and
compliance with best practices. The healing-centered framework
emphasizes safety promotion, which relies on requiring affirmative steps
by doctors and hospitals to improve care, rather than the threat of
punishment, which encourages providers to manage risk (and exposure to
liability). In other words, the objective is error reduction, not just risk
reduction.
Third, harm reduction is a core goal of the healing-centered
framework. Whereas safety promotion is forward looking and seeks to
prevent future errors, harm reduction seeks to remedy harms already
incurred by minimizing suffering and addressing emotional injury. In
other words, responses to medical errors must address not only patients'
physical symptoms, but also their emotional healing. Harm reduction also
requires the efficient resolution of claims through a fair process. Resolving
cases quickly helps patients (and healthcare providers) to avoid suffering
through years of litigation. These delays not only extend the suffering of
patients and healthcare providers, but also hinder learning that could
promote safety and help avoid harm to other patients in the future.
Importantly, however, quick resolution of patients' cases alone is not
enough. In order to enhance the parties' satisfaction with the resolution
and facilitate healing, the process must be one that is perceived as fair by
the parties involved.3°
Fourth, the healing-centered framework prioritizes improving
information exchange. There is significant value in ensuring both
physician-patient and physician-physician information flow. Physician-
patient information exchange is vital to the successful treatment of the
deserts, generally does not prevent future crime or allow for effective reintegration of offenders into
society.").
29 Risk reduction does not necessarily lead to error reduction. See infra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text; see also Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That
Safety Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 114, 169 (2001) ("The degree of risk reduction
that can be attained by a negligence standard depends on the evidence available to plaintiffs and courts
concerning the burdens and benefits of various safety precautions. When good evidence concerning
required safety precautions is unavailable, a potential injurer who fails to take such precautions will
escape liability.").
30 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance
About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1361, 1390 (2005)
("[T]he process by which a dispute is resolved has a distinct impact on the parties' satisfaction with the
resolution, over and above the distributive-that is, typically, the monetary---outcome ... [A] fair
process is a powerful factor in determining satisfaction.").
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patient. 31 "The relationship between doctor and patient is based on the
concept of partnership and collaborative effort. Ideally, decisions are made
through frank discussion, in which the doctor's clinical expertise and the
patient's individual needs and preferences are shared to select the best
treatment option., 32 An open dialogue has become increasingly important
as patients have become more knowledgeable, especially in recent years as
a result of the wealth of medical information available via the Internet.33
Improvements in information exchange can help restore trust between
patients and physicians. The healing-centered model also prioritizes
information exchange among healthcare providers. Any learning resulting
from particular errors should reach as many healthcare providers as
possible, rather than having healthcare providers repeat the mistakes of
their colleagues in order to gain the same knowledge.
Finally, underlying all aspects of the healing-centered framework is the
idea that a resolution must include restorative opportunities for all. This
entails more than just reducing suffering. It encompasses an inclusive
process that enables patients, healthcare professionals and the community
to restore relationships both in the specific case and in the broader sense of
restoring mutual trust between physicians and patients. This restoration of
relationships does not mean that a patient and physician must continue to
work together (though they can if both desire to do so). Rather, mutual
trust and confidence must be restored to ensure the welfare of both current
and future physician-patient relationships.
Having a medical error resolution system that achieves these five
objectives will ensure better results in patient treatment, as well as more
satisfying outcomes for healthcare providers and communities. The next
section uses this healing-centered framework to assess the viability of the
current medical malpractice liability system.
31 See CASSELL, supra note 11, at 70 (noting that "maximum possible openness to the patient
must be present").
32 JENNIFER JACKSON, TRUTH, TRUST AND MEDICINE 156 (2001) (quoting ANN SOMMERVILLE,
MEDICAL ETHICS TODAY: ITS PRACTICE AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (1993)).
33 See Ken Berger, Informed Consent: Information or Knowledge?, 22 MED. & L. 743, 747 (2003)
("[T]he interet and many other improvements in health care information technology are changing the
kind of knowledge patients consider material to making decisions about health care."); Nicolas P.
Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontidres (or How I Stopped Worrying About Viagra on the Web but Grew
Concerned about the Future of Healthcare Delivery), 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 183, 255-
56 (2004) (suggesting that Internet-sourced medical information must be used by patients "not as a
substitute for traditional physician-patient relationships, but as a way of increasing their knowledge and
asserting their autonomy within increasingly reticulated relationships"). But see Ingrid Dreezen,
Telemedicine and Informed Consent, 23 MED. & L. 541, 543 (2004) (noting that due to the Internet,
"the ability of patients to increase their knowledge grows, though no certainty can be given about the
effect of this knowledge on the patient-physician relationship").
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III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TODAY
Many different players in health care make medical errors,a4 including
doctors, nurses, hospital staff, Health Maintenance Organization
administration and staff, and others.3 5 Medical malpractice law is intended
to provide protection against such errors. The prevailing view is that it has
two primary purposes-to provide patients with compensation for injuries
resulting from substandard care and to deter healthcare providers from
negligent behavior.3 6 Analyzing the current system's performance based
on only these two factors, however, fails to provide a comprehensive
assessment with respect to all issues that a medical error resolution system
should cover. Thus, this section utilizes the healing-centered framework to
provide a more critical appraisal of today's medical malpractice liability
system.
A. Compensation of Victims
Under the healing-centered framework, medical malpractice liability
systems should ensure adequate compensation to patients injured as a
result of negligent medical intervention. 3' Nonetheless, the current system
fails by leaving most victims of medical error either without any
compensation or with compensation only after long delay.
An estimated 4% of hospitalized patients experience an adverse
incident caused by medical intervention. 38  Roughly half of these are
preventable and 25% of cases are the result of negligence.3 9 Therefore,
approximately 1% of hospitalized patients are injured as a result of medical
malpractice.4 ° Professor David Hyman explains the troubling effects of the
incidence of medical error, noting that hospitalized patients who are
victims of medical malpractice experience consequences ranging from
"complete recovery in less than one month (46% of those negligently
injured) to death (25% of those negligently injured). If these figures are
34 Recall that, as used herein, "medical errors" include both errors by individuals and systems
errors. See supra note 4.
35 Taylor, supra note 6, at 345.
36 Id.; Kachalia et al., supra note 6, at 417.
37 Negligence in the medical treatment context is traditionally defined as a breach of the standard
of care that a reasonable healthcare provider would have delivered in the same or similar
circumstances. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health Care Providers § 83 (2005).
38 HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 3 (1990). See also
David A. Hyman, Commentary, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and
What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (2002).
39 HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 38, at 3; Hyman, supra note 38 at 1642-43.
For a review of the major studies on patient injuries and malpractice claim frequency, see TOM BAKER,
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 25-36 (2005).
40 HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 38, at 3.
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extrapolated to the entire nation, adverse events account for more than
200,000 deaths every year, with medical negligence accounting for
120,000 (60%) of the total."4' These figures demonstrate the urgent need
for a system that effectively compensates injured patients (and reduces
error rates). But does medical malpractice litigation meet that need?
Tort reform proponents rely on a limited number of cases, in which
very large sums of money were awarded, to suggest that almost anyone
could obtain compensation for practically any injury.42 Empirical research
offers a very different picture. The seminal Harvard Medical Practice
Study, which reviewed hospital and insurance records, determined that
approximately "27,000 hospital patients in New York State in 1984 were
injured as a result of negligent medical care, but that fewer than 3,800
patients asserted medical malpractice claims. '4  Of those who did sue,
many of them did not have valid malpractice claims. This indicates that, of
the estimated 27,000 injured patients, the number that proceeded with a
malpractice lawsuit was significantly lower than 3,800. 44 A 1992 study in
Utah and Colorado also found a significant gap between the number of
injuries suffered and the number of claims, as well as a mismatch between
the individuals in ured by negligent care and those who asserted
malpractice claims. 5
In fact, studies of medical malpractice cases typically find that most
victims of substandard care do not file claims or recover any
compensation. 4 The Harvard Medical Practice Study revealed that only
41 Hyman, supra note 38, at 1643 (citations omitted).
42 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks et al., A Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Legal System Responses to
Medical Injuries, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 277, 277 (2005) ("[Quite a lot of discussion about medical
malpractice and corresponding law proceeds on erroneous assumptions, speculations, and anecdotal
impressions about the operations and effects of the existing system."); Kenneth G. Standard, President,
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Push for So-Called Tort Reform by President and Congress is a Mistake 1 (Jan.
14, 2005), http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/News/Letters to the Editor/socalledtort
reform.pdf (stating that tort reform proponents misleadingly suggest that the medical malpractice crisis
is due to a "litigation culture" in the United States and "slick trial lawyers" duping juries into awarding
outrageous amounts of money); see also David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation
Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 N. ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006) (reporting research
findings that show most claims lacking evidence of error are denied compensation).
43 See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 38; see also Catherine T. Struve,
Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 943, 976 (2004) (citing PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 69-70 (1993)).
4 See WEILER ET AL., supra note 43, at 71 (discussing the "mismatch" between those who are
injured and those who assert malpractice claims).
45 See David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 253-55 (2000).
46 See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem,
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 467 (2004); see also Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard
Medical Practice Study Conclusions about the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 501, 502 (2005) ("[T]he finding that most eligible people do not bring medical malpractice
claims is well supported and confirmed by other studies using both similar and very different research
methods" than the Harvard Medical Practice Study; however, "the finding that most medical
malpractice claims are not based on either iatrogenic injury or provider negligence stands on a small
and precarious empirical base."). One reason why many meritorious claims are not pursued is the way
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1/16 of patients, injured due to negligent acts actually received
compensation through the medical malpractice litigation system.47
According to the Physician Insurers Association of America, only 0.9% of
malpractice claims result in jury verdicts for the plaintiff (27.4% are settled
prior to trial; 67.7% are dropped or dismissed, and 4% result in a verdict
for the defendant).48
A related concern is that litigation can often drag on for years, with
multiple appeals, before any compensation is paid to injured patients. A
Philadelphia county judge noted that, in 1993, cases often languished for
six years before coming to trial.49 Changes were instituted and "[s]ince the
year 2000, medical malpractice cases have been routinely brought to trial
two years from initiation., 50 While these improvements are commendable,
the reality is that an injured patient must still wait two years before trial
(often while continuing to incur medical expenses) and then still face
several more years of waiting while the trial and appeals process works
itself out. The financial burden and years of delay in compensation come
at a time when the trauma of the injury has created great physical and
emotional stress for the patient and his or her family. Moreover, at the end
of the lengthy litigation process, there is a significant likelihood that a
plaintiff could receive no compensation at all.5'
An effective compensation system not only assures compensation to
those who deserve it, but also provides adequate compensation to such
individuals.52 Here again, public perception does not reflect the full
picture.53 Research findings on the size of jury awards are inconsistent.
that medical malpractice litigation is flunded. An injured patient considering legal action must find a
lawyer, and plaintiffs' attorneys are almost always paid on a contingency fee basis. Given the potential
expense of litigating any case, plaintiffs' attorneys can take only those cases that make "economic
sense." See David N. Hoffman, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, Again, 35 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 15, 17 (2005) ("Plaintiff's attorneys are less likely to bring a case worth seventy-five to one
hundred thousand dollars, no matter how strong the likelihood of success, than they are to bring a
multi-million dollar case with a questionable liability claim.").
47 See Taylor, supra note 6, at 348 n.40.
48 Christopher H. Schmitt, A Medical Mistake, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jun. 30, 2003, at 24-
27, available at LEXIS, News Library, USNPUB File. See also Taylor, supra note 6, at 348 (noting a
study finding that almost 50% of patients who proceeded to trial came away with nothing).
49 Mark I. Bernstein, The Opportunity for ADR in Medical Malpractice Cases, 26 PA. LAW. 32,32
(2004).
'
0 Id. at 33.
5' See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 26 (based on findings of the Physician Insurers Association of
America that among cases that reach the jury, a plaintiff has roughly only a one in five chance of a
favorable verdict).
52 Effective compensation also means that doctors and hospitals do not make settlement payments
on meritless claims.
53 Even in cases with large jury verdicts, there is often more to the story than is reported. Perhaps
the most famous case-the "McDonald's coffee case"-demonstrates the gap between perception and
reality. The media reported that a woman spilled coffee while driving through a McDonald's drive-
thru, sued, and was awarded $2.7 million in punitive damages. Troy L. Cady, Disadvantaging the
Disadvantaged The Discriminatory Effects of Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1005,
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Some have suggested that the median award doubled between 1995 and
2000 from $500,000 to $1 million.54 Others report that the median award
is approximately $295,000, "far below the median jury award of $1 million
the [American Medical Association] and others often cite., 55 Whatever the
case, the average size of awards does not tell us whether compensation was
adequate in particular cases. What we do know, however, is that the
majority of patients injured in the course of treatment fail to receive
compensation from the medical malpractice litigation system.
The fact that the majority of patients who suffer injury as a result of
negligent care receive no remedy from medical malpractice litigation is a
strong indictment of the system. Moreover, those who do receive
compensation often must wait years to do so, and may or may not receive
adequate compensation. When malpractice litigation fails to provide
compensation for most of the injured, it not only fails with respect to one
of its core tasks, but it also fails under a healing-centered framework
analysis.56
1032 (1997). This sound-bite-friendly portrayal made for good headlines. Lost in the uproar was that
McDonald's coffee was considerably hotter than that at other fast-food restaurants; McDonalds had
faced hundreds of prior claims from individuals burned by its coffee; and the eighty-one-year-old
woman suffered third-degree burns on 6% of her body, was hospitalized for eight days, and initially
offered to settle her claim for only $20,000, but was rejected. Id. at 1033. Further, the trial court
reduced the amount of punitive damages to $480,000, and the case ultimately settled for an undisclosed
amount. Id. See also Joseph T. Hallinan, In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely Have the Last Word,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting on a
case in which a New York state jury awarded a couple $112 million in a medical-malpractice case filed
on behalf of their brain-damaged daughter, but ultimately only received $6 million). In addition, "[i]n
2000, Pennsylvania reported three of the largest medical-malpractice verdicts in its history, all of them
rendered in Philadelphia: one for $100 million, another for $55 million and a third for $49.6 million."
Id. These cases ultimately settled for dramatically less: the $55 million case settled for $7.5 million,
the $49.6 million case settled for $8.4 million, and the $100 million case settled for an undisclosed
sum, which the plaintiff's attorney indicated was "significantly less than $100 million." Id. The point
here is not to argue the merits of these cases, but rather to suggest that the anecdotal evidence behind
the push for tort reform is often misleading. Misleading evidence, in turn, leads to framing the issue
incorrectly and developing solutions that do not address most important problems.
54 Gunnar, supra note 3, at 477 (reviewing the impact of malpractice on doctors, lawyers, and the
insurance industry, but not the impact on patients). One reason why award sizes may have increased is
that plaintiff's attorneys cannot take smaller cases in which expenses could exceed awards. See
Hoffman, supra note 46, at 17 (noting that the economics of contingency fee-based litigation make it
likely that plaintiffs' attorneys will pass on small claims and take those cases where damages are
potentially very large); see also Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice
Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming 2007)
(on file with Connecticut Law Review) (finding amounts recovered by plaintiffs often capped by
medical malpractice insurance policy limits).
55 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 25.
56 See Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Legal Responses to
Medical Error, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 37, 40 (2003) ("[W]e know that the tort system as a compensation
device is almost unconscionably inefficient."); William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability
Insurance and the Medical Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 10, 14 ("If medical
errors are widespread, compensating injured patients takes on considerable social importance. Tort
litigation is poorly equipped to accomplish this task because third-party liability insurers are
preoccupied with deterring claims and contesting fault.").
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B. Safety Promotion
Safety promotion mandates a focus on error reduction, rather than risk
reduction, with a view to improving standards of care and compliance with
best practices. This distinction between error reduction and risk reduction
illuminates one of the primary drawbacks of the current medical-
malpractice liability system.
The high incidence of medical error suggests that the current system is
failing to produce an effective response. In a 1999 report, the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die
each year as a result of preventable medical error.5 7 Others have suggested
that the number may be twice as high. 8 Four percent of hospitalized
patients experience an adverse event, and 1% of patients suffer due to a
negligent act.5 9 Health care's 96% proficiency rate may sound high, but
compare the fact that a 99.9% proficiency rate in the airline industry would
mean two unsafe airplane landings every day at Chicago's O'Hare airport
and, in banking, 32,000 checks would be debited from the wrong account
each hour.60 While we can never completely prevent error from ever
occurring, such error rates would be unacceptable in other fields and
61should not be tolerated in health care.
To successfully reduce medical error, a liability system must help
determine standards of conduct that will reduce errors and foster
compliance with such standards. The current system fails on both counts.
Medical malpractice "standards of fault and causality are vague and
inconsistent, experts routinely disagree, results are unpredictable,
deterrence signals are confounded by liability insurance, and high rates of
57 IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. See also Baker, supra note 46, at 502 ("Over 75,000 people
die every year from medical malpractice, more than the total number of deaths from automobile and
workplace accidents combined."). For an update on the IOM study, see Maxine M. Harrington,
Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a
Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329, 380-81 (2005) (stating that "it is debatable whether
any real improvement has been made" in patient safety in the five years since the IOM's findings were
published).
58 See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also WEILER, supra note 5, at 12 (reporting that
the number of deaths or serious injuries due to negligence of physicians and hospitals exceeds 180,000
each year); Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error In Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and
Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 357, 358 (2005) (reporting findings that "[n]early half of all patients had
errors in care" and "[n]early one in five patients had errors with a serious harm").
59 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
60 Andrea Gerlin, For a Systemic Problem, No Easy Fix, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1999, at Al.
61 Some might raise questions regarding potential costs of prevention, suggesting that U.S. society
may not be willing to pay these costs. I submit that there is evidence that many errors could be avoided
without incurring significant costs. Moreover, the costs incurred to reduce errors would serve to save
costs caused by errors (as well as lives). See, e.g., Baker, supra note 39, at 93 (noting that
anesthesiologists have been among the most willing to learn from mistakes and as a result now pay less
for malpractice insurance that most other hospital-based doctors).
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preventable error and injury persist. ' 6 2  Physicians-the primary target
population of deterrence-believe liability relates more to the severity of
the patient's injury than to whether the injury was a result of actual
negligence.63 Additionally, each year approximately fifteen claims are
filed for every one hundred physicians in the United States, and 30% of
those claims result in an insurance payment.64 With rising numbers of
claims and increasing payouts,65 it is no surprise that many doctors worry
about malpractice and feel that they are at constant risk of being second-
guessed by expert witnesses at trial.
Many physicians feel that they are being singled out and portrayed
negatively.66  The Harvard Medical Practice Study found that doctors'
perception of the risk of being sued is three times greater than the actual
risk.6  A study on doctors' views in Pennsylvania found that "[t]hree-
fourths of specialists agreed with the statement, 'Because of concerns
about malpractice liability, I view every patient as a potential malpractice
lawsuit." ,8 In addition, 91% of specialists surveyed reported that the
medical malpractice liability system limits physicians' ability to provide
the highest quality care.69 Concern over the threat of lawsuits and large
damages awards likely leads some doctors to practice "defensive
medicine."
Defensive medicine involves physicians altering their practice in order
to reduce the risk of lawsuits.70 It results in some doctors ordering
unnecessary tests, which drives up the costs of health care and leads to
62 Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients Safer:
"Avoidable Classes of Events " are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHics 478, 479 (2005). Not
all of these claims have merit. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
63 Dauer, supra note 56, at 39.
64 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4 (2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfmi?index=4968&sequence=0.
65 Id. at 3-4 (reporting that the average payout on malpractice claims rose from $95,000 in 1986
to $320,000 in 2002, reflecting an annual growth rate of almost 8%, which was more than double the
general rate of inflation). But see Zeiler et al., supra note 54 (finding claim rates and average payments
in Texas remained relatively stable from 1990-2003).
66 See Gunnar, supra note 3, at 476.67 See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 38, at 9; see also Bryan Liang, Medical
Malpractice: Do Physicians Have Knowledge of Legal Standards and Assess Cases as Juries Do?, 3 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 59, 90 (1996) (reporting survey data suggesting physicians do not fully
understand the legal standards for medical malpractice).
68 Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring for Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician Satisfaction
and Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 42, 48-49, available at http://content.health
affairs.org (search by author name and year).
69 Id. at 49. Mello et al. acknowledge that it is difficult to determine the extent to which doctors
may overstate their unhappiness or fear of litigation, but suggest that the data indicate that "physicians'
fear of lawsuits may be well-founded." Id. at 51.
70 See, e.g., Kachalia et al., supra note 6, at 418; see also BAKER, supra note 39, at 120-34
(reporting on research on defensive medicine); Liang, supra note 67, at 91 ("[Physicians'] tendency to
overestimate jury error probability, in addition to misperceptions of negligence and physician-jury
divergence in negligence determinations, may represent a significant source of defensive medicine."
(footnote omitted)).
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cost-cutting measures that adversely affect patient care.7' Second, it causes
certain doctors to take actions that reduce risk of liability rather than risk of
error.72 Some doctors may elect not to treat certain high-risk patients. In
addition, physicians may take other preventive actions to avoid the risk of
liability. "A physician who puts less information into a chart, for example,
in an effort to avoid creating evidence for some imagined future
malpractice claim may be reducing liability risks but at the expense of
increasing patient safety risks." 3
In all of these cases, medical judgment is supplanted, at least in part,
by a desire to avoid legal risk. The safety promotion component of the
healing-centered framework enables us to see these shortcomings more
clearly. Thus, by utilizing this new framework for analysis, we can see
that in these cases risk reduction trumps error reduction, and the system
fails to ensure that medical judgment informs best practices and that
healthcare providers follow such standards in all cases.
C. Harm Reduction
Another problem with a litigation-based recovery system is that upon
learning that a patient has been injured, a doctor is often instructed not to
apologize or say anything that could be construed as an admission of
fault.74 Once it appears an injured patient may seek legal assistance, direct
communication between the doctor and patient ceases. Communications
then take place through the attorneys for each party. Not only does the
patient not receive an apology or any other expression of empathy or
caring from the doctor (who may have been the patient's physician for
years, or even decades),75 but information flow also ceases.76 In one study
of malpractice litigation, patients in over 70% of cases complained about
71 But see Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 11 Q.J.
ECON. 353, 385-386 (1996) (finding that, overall, "defensive medicine" practices have a "limited
impact on health care expenditure growth").
72 See, e.g., I INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY
OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 75-76 (1989) (reporting on dramatic increases in rates of cesarean sections and
other procedures in response to threats of lawsuits).
73 Dauer, supra note 56, at 39-40.
74 See FED. R. EvID. 801(d). On the value of apology, see AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 173
(2004); Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1121,
1169-70(2002).
75 The emotional trauma experienced by the patient at this point does not necessarily diminish if
the physician-patient relationship is relatively new. In the modem hospital setting, patients are often
referred by their regular physician to new providers in the hospital for specialized care. Here, mutual
trust is less developed and more susceptible to fracture when information does not flow freely.
76 Dauer, supra note 56, at 42 (noting research that demonstrates "convincingly that money.., is
in fact not the dominant need or drive of those patients and family members who bring claims against
their physicians. Money may be a surrogate, but it is not a fully satisfying one").
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the doctor "devaluing patients' views, deserting the patient, and delivering
information poorly.",
77
The cynical observer may think that an apology has limited value and
that patients sue only for money. However, empirical research suggests
otherwise. A study published in the Lancet, the leading British medical
journal, found that as many as 37% of medical malpractice plaintiffs
reported that they would not have filed their lawsuits if their doctors had
sincerely apologized instead of stonewalling.78 Similarly, Liebman and
Hyman have found that "[a]fter a medical error or adverse event, the
proper type of apology can have a powerful impact on the patient or
family, making them less angry and suspicious.
' 79
An apology facilitates patients' emotional healing. 80  Access to
information helps patients regain a sense of control and empowerment, as
well as a voice in the process. Patients need doctors and other health care
professionals to attend to the emotional and psychological aspects of
healing, not just the physical. 81  Providing apologies to, and sharing
information with, patients enables them to feel that their emotional needs
are being addressed, that they understand and have some control over what
is happening to them, and that they have support from their doctors and
hospitals during their time of need. The litigation-based system, by
contrast, discourages apologies, thus hindering patients' (and physicians')
healing.
The other requirement under harm reduction is efficient and fair
resolution of cases in order to minimize the suffering of both patients and
healthcare providers. Medical malpractice litigation can drag on for years,
77 MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 266 (6th ed. 2003) (citing Wendy
Levinson, Physician-Patient Communication: A Key to Malpractice Prevention, 272 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 1619, 1619 (1994)).
78 Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking
Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994). See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 72, at 88
(citing "breakdown in communication between the doctor and patient" as a primary reason behind
many lawsuits); Dauer, supra note 56, at 42; G. B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to
File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1359, 1361
(1992) (finding that 24% of families sued because they felt their physician lied or was not being
completely honest, while an additional 20% sued because they felt they could not get anyone to tell
them what happened).
79 Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stem Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure of
Errors and Adverse Events to Patients, HEALTH AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 22, 27.
8
0 See generally THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
FAILS TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT 179-210 (2004) (on apology). Recognizing the value of apologies,
twenty-nine states have passed legislation providing immunity for doctors' apologies, including:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. The Sorry Works! Coalition, States with Apology Laws,
http://www.sorryworks.netlmedia25.phtml (follow "link" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
S Both elements are important aspects of the healing process. See Liebman & Hyman, supra note
79, at 27 ("[A] prompt apology coupled with an explanation of the event and a fair offer of
compensation are critical steps in rebuilding trust between the physician and the patient.").
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extending the physical and emotional suffering experienced by patients
whose claims remain unresolved and preventing them (and their care
providers) from achieving closure. Moreover, neither patients nor
healthcare providers view the current process as fair. As such, the current
medical malpractice liability system fails to address this important element
of harm reduction.
D. Fostering Information Exchange
In order to develop a medical malpractice system that prioritizes care
and healing, information exchange-both between healthcare providers
and their patients and among healthcare providers-is essential. The
current medical malpractice liability system deters open dialogue and
information exchange to the detriment of patient care as well as the
emotional well-being of both patients and healthcare providers.
In recent years, scholars and practitioners have recognized that the
healthcare system has held doctors to an impossibly high standard (read:
mistake-free), and that the medical malpractice liability system has
encouraged doctors to deny evidence of mistakes and thus miss
opportunities to improve their skills, their decision-making and, ultimately,
the service they provide.8 2 As Professor Lucian Leape explains:
"Physicians are socialized in medical school and residency to strive for
error-free practice. There is a powerful emphasis on perfection, both in
diagnosis and treatment. In everyday hospital practice, the message is
equally clear: mistakes are unacceptable. 83 Medical errors are often not
discussed even privately among colleagues.8 4 Leape summarizes the
dilemma facing doctors:
[A]II physicians recognize that mistakes are inevitable. Most
would like to examine their mistakes and learn from them.
From an emotional standpoint, they need the support and
understanding of their colleagues and patients when they
make mistakes. Yet, they are denied both insight and support
by misguided concepts of infallibility and by fear: fear of
embarrassment by colleagues, fear of patient reaction, and
fear of litigation. 5
82 David Blumenthal, Making Medical Errors Into 'Medical Treasures,' 272 J. Am. MED. ASS'N
1867, 1867-68 (1994).
83 Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1851, 1851 (1994). See also
ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 37 (2002)
("Western medicine is dominated by a single imperative-the quest for machinelike perfection in the
delivery of care.").
8 See Leape, supra note 83, at 1852.
85 Id.
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Medical malpractice litigation discourages doctors from admitting
mistakes or questioning their decision-making abilities, at least not until
proven wrong in a court of law (or until the statute of limitations has run).86
Research has demonstrated that "blame and the accompanying threat of
punishment and stigmatization activates defensive mechanisms, drives out
information about systemic vulnerabilities, stops learning, and undermines
the potential for improvement. 87  Because litigation may drag on for
years, the learning process and any resulting improvements in practice are
frustrated or put on hold until resolution of the lawsuit, meaning that safety
promotion is also hindered.88
The threat of litigation, coupled with the culture of perfection,
discourages the flow of information from physicians to patients and among
doctors. In addition, the threat of litigation fosters a culture of mistrust that
affects the information sharing by both patients and doctors. All of this
hinders the development of care relationships and frustrates doctors'
opportunities to learn and improve the care they provide.
E. Providing Restorative Opportunities for All Parties
The final goal under the healing-centered framework is to ensure that
all parties have an opportunity for restoration and healing. This step takes
redress of medical errors beyond harm reduction. It requires fostering an
inclusive process that enables patients, healthcare professionals, and the
community to restore relationships both in the case at hand and in the
broader sense of restoring mutual trust between physicians and patients.
Drawing on restorative justice's tripartite approach, I analyze the current
system's ability to provide restorative opportunities from the perspective of
patients, doctors, and the community.
86 See GAWANDE, supra note 83, at 57 (stating that medical malpractice lawsuits prevent doctors
from acknowledging and discussing errors publicly, and that "[w]hen things go wrong, it's almost
impossible for a physician to talk to a patient honestly about mistakes"); see also Gerlin, supra note 60,
at Al ("[S]tudies have found that only 5 percent to 10 percent of all medical errors are reported to
hospital administrators; the remaining 90 percent to 95 percent go unreported."); Andrea Gerlin, Mum
is Often the Word When Caregivers Stumble, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1999, at Al [hereinafter
Gerlin, Mum is Often the Word] (reporting on a study that found "only 54 percent of medical residents
discussed their mistakes with their attending doctors, who are legally and ethically responsible for
them"). But see David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the US.:
Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 893, 893
(2005) (arguing that fear of malpractice lawsuits does not discourage error reporting).
87 David D. Woods, Conflicts Between Learning and Accountability in Patient Safety, 54 DEPAUL
L. REv. 485, 488 (2005).
88 While other factors-such as personal pride of physicians and internal hierarchy of hospitals--
also influence information exchange, there is general agreement that the threat of litigation is a
significant factor. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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1. Patient Perspective
Medical malpractice lawsuits do not restore trust or relationships.89 In
recent decades, the level of trust and confidence in the medical profession
has eroded. In 1966, Americans had a 73% confidence level in medicine
(higher than the 40% average for other fields at that time), but that
confidence has steadily declined, with 1993 producing a record low of
22%.90 A 1993 American Medical Association survey sheds light on some
of the possible reasons for the decline, noting that "69% of the respondents
felt that doctors were 'too interested in making money' and 70% believed
that 'people are beginning to lose faith in doctors.' 9' Philip Peters
explains: "Money appears to play a role in the rise of cynicism. In a 1996
national poll, 82% of respondents believed that medical care had become a
big business and that the industry put profits ahead of patients. 92 Doctors
spend less time with patients, refer them to specialists with whom the
patients have little or no prior relationship, and generally offer little to
address the emotional side of the patient experience.93 When medical
errors occur, the problem is only exacerbated.
After a patient is injured as a result of medical care, doctors' reluctance
to apologize and share information makes them appear incapable of or
unwilling to empathize with patients who are suffering. A dehumanized
response by doctors undermines the care relationship and destroys the trust
that patients have in their doctors. It leaves patients in an anxiety-
provoking position, needing medical care but feeling they cannot trust their
doctors and unsure of where else to turn.
2. Physician Perspective
For many physicians, the current medical malpractice liability system
fosters dissatisfaction by increasing financial stress, heightening anxiety
associated with the practice of medicine (by the potential threat of being
second guessed in hindsight at trial), and creating a frustrating dynamic
whereby the patients that doctors are trying to help may be the very same
individuals who might sue them. Physician satisfaction and emotional
well-being matter, not only for producing happy doctors but also for
ensuring quality of care. Professor Michelle Mello explains the effect:
89 See Hall, supra note 23, at 306.
90 Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 196 (2000).
91 Id. (citation omitted).
92 Id. at 197.
93 See id. at 198; see also LAW & POLAN, supra note 6, at 208 (citing overspecialization as a
significant factor in the deterioration of the physician-patient relationship).
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Satisfied physicians tend to be more attentive to patients and
to have higher levels of satisfaction among their patients.
Physician dissatisfaction, on the other hand, has been linked
to riskier prescribing practices. Dissatisfied physicians are
also more likely to leave clinical practice or relocate,
disrupting continuity of care and jeopardizing access to
services in underserved regions.94
Malpractice proceedings and the constant threat of malpractice take an
emotional toll on doctors, the effects of which are felt by the health care
system.
95
One of the most commonly cited adverse effects of the current system
on doctors is the soaring cost of insurance premiums for doctors. Some
doctors have received renewal notices from their insurers informing them
of 100% to 200% increases in their premiums over the prior year.96 Others
have simply been informed that their insurer will no longer provide
coverage for their high-risk specialty, forcing these physicians to search for
new coverage.97 Overall, government reports have found that medical
malpractice insurance premiums for physicians nationwide rose by 15%
between 2000 and 2002.98 Certain specialties were disproportionately
affected, such as obstetricians/gynecologists (22% increase) and internists
and general surgeons (33% increase). 99
Rising insurance premiums can affect the financial situation of
physicians and their families. They also have an adverse effect on morale,
as well-meaning doctors who aim to provide for and serve their community
become discouraged by having to spend such a substantial portion of their
salary on protecting themselves from the very same individuals that they
are trying to help. This dynamic can inhibit the development of trust
between physician and patient, which in turn may adversely affect
94 Mello et al., supra note 68, at 43 (citations omitted).
95 Id. at 44. The current liability system, in theory, should operate such that non-negligent doctors
should not have to worry about being sued. There is evidence that it works in a number of cases, see,
for example, David Studdert et al., supra note 42 (finding most claims involving no error receive no
compensation), but as discussed in this section, the current system affects physicians in ways that do
not foster optimal care arrangements.
96 MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF NON-ECONOMIC
DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS, AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE
4 (2003). See also Michelle M. Mello et al., Hospitals' Behavior in a Tort Crisis: Observations from
Pennsylvania, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 225, 225 (reporting insurance premium increases of
"25-100 percent or more"). The actual amounts of malpractice premiums for some doctors can be as
high as $200,000 per year or more. Paul C. Weiler, Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically
Moderate-and Ethical-Fashion, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 205, 208-09 (2005).
97 WEISS ET AL., supra note 96, at 4.
98 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 64, at 14. See also Rhode, supra note 46, at 458 (reporting
that in 2002 alone, malpractice premiums in some areas and specialties increased between 40% and
112%).
99 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 64, at 14.
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information exchange between the two and, ultimately, the quality of care
provided. '
The expectation of perfection and the threat of litigation lead to a
reluctance among doctors to admit and talk openly about mistakes, and
promote a culture of protecting one's colleagues.10' Just as a doctor would
not want to be second-guessed by others, so too will he or she reserve
judgment when viewing other doctors' actions. This circling-the-wagons
approach fosters an "us vs. them" environment that pits doctors against
patients and the community. This is the opposite of what is needed in the
context of the doctor-patient relationship-an intimate relationship based
on care and trust. When patients cease to trust doctors, information flow is
hindered, making the doctor's job more difficult and less enjoyable. All of
the above factors weigh heavily on doctors today and increase the risk of
medical error.'
0 2
3. Community Perspective
As discussed above, the current system permits mistakes to continue
and operates to foster mistrust of doctors and other health care
professionals. 0 3  A lack of trust in the health care system makes
individuals more reluctant to see a physician.'4 Consequently, individuals
present at health care facilities later in time, when their conditions have
worsened, making it more difficult to treat them. 10 5  Patients suffer
1oo Lorraine E. Ferris, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence And Preventive Law To Examine
Disputants' Best Interests In Mediating Cases About Physicians' Practices: A Guide For Medical
Regulators, 23 MED. & L. 183, 183 (2004) ("The patient-doctor relationship relies on mutual respect,
on trust in the physician's technical and psychosocial competence, and on the patient's confidence that
appropriate care is being given."). See also CASSELL, supra note 11, at 71 (explaining the importance
of trust in a doctor-patient relationship).
1o1 See, e.g., Struve, supra note 43, at 995 ("[P]hysicians may be reluctant to hold their colleagues
liable for errors in judgment that do not rise to the level of gross neglect.").
102 While this section focused on doctors, nurses and other healthcare providers also experience
many of these burdens.
103 See Gerlin, Mum is Often the Word, supra note 86, at AI (reporting that "hundreds of patients
suffer medical errors at hospitals across the country every day. One reason the problems persist is that
medical professionals routinely do not tell patients or their families about the errors."); Sage, supra
note 56, at 16 ("The principal method used to contain costs-managed care-also reduces patients' and
jurors' trust in medical providers and taints bad outcomes with commercial motivation, potentially
increasing the rate and magnitude of claims, settlements, and verdicts and raising the specter of
punitive damages.").
"o See Stefanie Mollbom et al., Delayed Care and Unmet Needs Among Health Care System
Users: When Does Fiduciary Trust in a Physician Matter?, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1898, 1898 (2005)
("Patients' fiduciary trust in a physician is negatively associated with the likelihood of reporting
delayed care and unmet health care needs among most patients."); see also Janice Blanchard & Nicole
Lurie, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Patient Reports of Disrespect in the Health Care Setting and Its Impact on
Care, 53 J. FAM. PRAc. 721, 721 (2004) (finding individuals who felt a lack of respect from doctor
based on race were more likely to put off seeking care).
105 In some instances, patients' mistrust of doctors leads them to wait so long that it is too late to
treat them, further undermining the community's faith in the system.
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accordingly. Moreover, presenting at a health care facility when one's
condition has worsened increases the overall cost of health care.
Absorbing these additional costs puts further strain on an already
financially burdened system. In turn, a portion of these costs are ultimately
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher costs for various
treatments or increases in the cost of health care insurance.
As health care costs increase, fewer people are able to afford needed
care. In 2003, forty-five million individuals were without insurance for the
entire year (representing over 15% of the civilian, non-institutionalized
population of the United States).10 6 A study of six industrialized nations'
health care systems found that the "United States is an outlier for financial
burdens on patients and patients foregoing care because of costs. Half of
sicker adults in the United States said that they did not see a doctor when
sick, did not get recommended treatment, or did not fill a prescription
because of cost.'
10 7
Kaiser Family Foundation research reveals the troubling consequences
of the high cost of health care. Approximately four out of every ten
individuals with chronic conditions report that "they or a family member
has avoided filling a prescription, has skipped recommended medical tests
or treatment, or has cut pills or skipped doses of medicine because of the
cost.,' 0 8  Twenty-three percent of adults report having problems paying
medical bills within the previous year, even though 61% of these
individuals have health insurance, and 70% of uninsured individuals report
cost as the primary reason for being without health insurance.1°9 In short,
the increasing cost of health care is leaving a growing number of
individuals without the means to afford treatment, and in some instances
the consequences are fatal." 0
Finally, skyrocketing health care costs burden the entire economy."'
Based on health care expenditure per capita and total expenditure as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the United States spends
106 Cathi M. Callahan & James W. Mays, Estimating the Number of Individuals in the United
States Without Health Insurance I (U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Working Paper, Mar. 31,
2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/05/est-uninsured/report.pdf.
107 Cathy Schoen et al., Taking the Pulse of Health Care Systems: Experiences of Patients with
Health Problems in Six Countries, W5 HEALTH AFF. 509, 519 (2005), available at http://content.health
affairs.org/webexclusives/index.dtl?year=2005 (follow "PDF" hyperlink).
... KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER PUBLIC OPINION SPOTLIGHT, THE PUBLIC ON HEALTH
CARE COSTS 1 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.kff'org/spotlight/healthcosts/index.cfn.
'09 Id. at 1-2.
10 See Weiler, supra note 96, at 214 ("[A]n estimated 18,000 unnecessary American deaths occur
every year because of lack of access to health care.").
. Many factors contribute to the high cost of health care. See id. at 208 ("[M]alpractice
insurance and litigation costs have long represented just around 1% of our total health care costs.").
While this is true, the economic impact of medical malpractice is much more than just the cost of
insurance and litigation. The current system's failure to reduce error results in substantial additional
expenditure on health care to treat those injured by error, to name just one additional cost.
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more on health care than any other country in the world."l 2 Using 1998
figures, the United States spent $4178 per capita on health care, easily
outdistancing the second biggest spender, Switzerland ($2794) and more
than doubling average per capita spending for OECD countries ($1783)."'
In 2004, the United States spent an estimated $1.9 trillion on health care,
equivalent to roughly 16% of its GDP. I r4  The high cost affects not only
quality of care and access to care but also the overall economy." 5 This
dramatic ripple effect reinforces the need for a system that offers
restorative opportunities, so that mutual trust can be rebuilt and healing can
come to all parties.
The healing-centered framework highlights the multiple short-comings
of the current system. Today's medical malpractice liability system fails to
provide compensation for too many patients, is unsuccessful in promoting
safety, does not reduce harm or minimize suffering to the extent needed,
provides disincentives for information exchange, and offers little in the
way of restorative opportunities for all parties. The next section considers
whether other available options offer greater hope.
IV. CURRENT REFORM EFFORTS AND ALTERNATIVES
Various tort reform measures and alternative dispute resolution
schemes attempt to deal with medical malpractice. Using the healing-
centered framework, we can assess the relative merits of current reforms
and alternatives. This section briefly considers commonly-proposed
reforms for the current system (caps on damages, statutes of limitations,
and attorneys' fees) and the following alternative models: arbitration,
mediation, no-fault liability, enterprise liability, screening panels, and
medical courts.
A. "Fixing" the Current System
Current tort reform measures-most notably caps on non-economic
damages, reductions in the statutes of limitations, and limitations on
112 BUREAU OF LAB. EDUC., UNIV. OF ME., THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: BEST IN THE
WORLD, OR JUST THE MOST EXPENSIVE? 2 (2001), available at http://dll.umaine.edu/ble/U.S.%20
HCweb.pdf.
113 Id. See also Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International Context,
HEALTH AFF., May-June 2004, at 10, 11-12 (noting, pursuant to 2001 figures, that Switzerland spent
only 68% as much on health per capita as the United States, and Canada spent only 57% as much).
114 Desperate Measures: The World's Biggest and Most Expensive Health-Care System is
Beginning to Fall Apart. Can George Bush Mend It?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 26, 2006, at 24.
'" See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., What Have We Learned Since the Harvard Medical
Practice Study, in MEDICAL ERROR: WHAT Do WE KNow? WHAT DO WE Do? 3, 19-20 (Marilynn M.
Rosenthal & Kathleen M. Sutcliffe eds., 2002) (based on the HMPS and other medical error studies,
adverse events in medical practice likely resulted in a total national cost of $38 billion to $50 billion
per year).
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attorneys' fees-are reforms aimed foremost at addressing compensation
issues. However, these reform measures target the much smaller problem
of occasional windfall victories for injured plaintiffs while exacerbating
the much greater problem of the current system's failure to compensate the
thousands of individuals injured by substandard care.
1. Non-Economic Damages
Non-economic damages are a favorite target of tort reform proponents
who argue that such damages provide a windfall for undeserving plaintiffs
and contribute significantly to the astronomical cost of health care today." 
6
Non-economic damages, which are often characterized as compensation
for "pain and suffering," really represent much more; they include "the
cost of restoring the plaintiff as nearly as possible to the quality of life that
he [or she] enjoyed before the injury."'"17  As David Hoffman explains,
"[s]ome of that money surely represents compensation for the physical
pain during and following an injury, but a more significant portion
represents the actual cost of adapting the plaintiff to pursue whatever
profession or avocation gave the plaintiff's life meaning before theinjury. ' 18 Such damage awards offer additional compensation in cases
where economic damages may have been undervalued and provide
incentive to injured individuals reluctant to come forward to proceed with
their claims and help enforce the rule of law."9
Conversely, caps on non-economic damages effectively force the most
seriously injured patients to take on a disproportionate share of the costs of
medical errors.1 20  Caps on non-economic damages could result in fewer
injured patients with legitimate claims being able to pursue litigation, as
the costs of pursuing each claim may be higher than the capped damage
awards, leaving such patients unable to find attorneys to take their cases.'
2 1
116 See Cady, supra note 53, at 1009, 1011; Hoffman, supra note 46, at 18 (noting that President
Bush has pushed for a hard cap of $250,000 for all non-economic awards).
117 Hoffman, supra note 46, at 18. See also Cady, supra note 53, at 1009 (noting that punitive
damages also serve the necessary functions of deterrence and punishing defendants for truly outrageous
conduct).
118 Hoffman, supra note 46, at 18.
119 Cady, supra note 53, at 1010-12. Cady also suggests that educating the public of their legal
rights is another function. Id. at 1010.
120 See LAW & POLAN, supra note 6, at 139 (stating that the medical malpractice crisis "will not
be solved by forcing the most seriously injured into dependency on friends, families, or welfare"); see
also Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 465 (Wis. 2005) (striking down
Wisconsin's cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases as unconstitutional, in part
because "the burden of the cap falls entirely on the most seriously injured victims of medical
malpractice").
121 See Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An Alternative to
Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 385, 387 (2005); Rachel Zimmerman & Joseph T.
Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases: Limits on Awards for
Suffering Create New Impediments, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at Al, available at LEXIS, News
Library, WSJNL File.
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2. Statutes of Limitations
Prior to the 1970s, the statute of limitations in medical malpractice
cases was governed by general tort laws.122  During the medical
malpractice crisis of the 1970s, however, a number of reforms were
instituted to limit the liability of medical practitioners. 23  Many states
shortened statutes of limitations for medical malpractice claims in order to
reduce the number of lawsuits and address the "long tail problem that
forced insurance companies to impose artificially high present premiums to
protect against increased future damage awards.' 24 Currently, every state
has placed some limitation on the length of time in which medical
malpractice claims can be brought-typically about two years. 21 Peter
Zablotsky comments on the absence of pure discovery-based statutes of
limitations:
[A]dvocates for medical practitioners prevailed in their
efforts to impose restrictive statutes of limitations in the
medical malpractice context. No state adopted a pure
discovery based statute of limitations to govern medical
malpractice. This is so despite the fact that pure discovery
based statutes of limitations have become common place for
most other negligence based torts.'
26
Again, this measure, while touted as a means of reducing frivolous
lawsuits, does nothing to ensure that meritorious cases are discovered and
it fails to improve patient compensation. In fact, medical malpractice
statutes of limitations have been challenged and, in some cases, struck
down as unconstitutional.
27
3. Attorneys'Fees
Another common critique proffered by tort reform proponents is that
plaintiffs lawyers retain too much of the claimant's ultimate recovery
122 Peter Zablotsky, From a Whimper to a Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occurrence Based
Statutes of Limitation Governing Negligent Misdiagnosis of Diseases with Long Latency Periods
Unconstitutional, 103 DICK. L. REV. 455, 457 (1999).
123 Id. at 458-59.
124 Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted). See also Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration in
the New Millennium: Much Ado About Nothing?, I PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 45, 61 (2000) (noting that
the "statutes were enacted to fix the problem of the 'long tail' in which claims for injuries are not
immediately apparent").
125 Nevers, supra note 124, at 61-62.
126 Zablotsky, supra note 122, at 463.
127 See id at 457 ("[N]early one-third of the states have either found their statutes of limitations
governing medical malpractice to be unconstitutional as applied to victims of medical malpractice who
could not have discovered their injuries until well after the statutory period had expired, or have
interpreted their statutes to provide for open discovery.").
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because of high contingency fee arrangements. ' This argument is used to
advocate for limitations on fees so that "more of actual recovery is
channeled back to the victims.' ' 129 Supporters also suggest that limiting
contingency fees will reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits.
130
Like other quick fixes for the malpractice litigation system, limiting
contingency fees fails to address patient compensation adequately.
"Instead of protecting patients, such laws leave injured patients with no
remedy at all" by making it less likely that a plaintiff with a legitimate but
relatively small claim will be able to secure representation, because
attorneys will not risk taking cases in which damages awarded may not
cover their costs.'
31
Equally important, beyond failing to improve the tort system's
capacity to compensate victims, current reforms related to non-economic
damages, statutes of limitations, and attorneys' fees fail to foster
improvements with respect to other components of the healing-centered
framework. These measures create incentives for risk management, not
safety promotion, potentially leading to questionable treatment decisions.
Professor Kathryn Zeiler suggests, for example, that in situations in which
providing compliant treatment is particularly costly, caps could have the
effect of leading doctors and managed care organizations to provide
alternative care and face potential liability, rather than provide the costly
treatment that complies with the legal standard of care. 132 Such results will
serve to increase the number of injuries and further burden the health care
system with additional claims and costs.
Moreover, by failing to address the emotional needs of patients or
ensure efficient or fair resolution of claims, these measures fail to facilitate
harm reduction. They also leave incentives unchanged for information
sharing, as doctors still face the constant threat of litigation, and thus
patients have no greater assurances of access to information. Finally, they
do nothing to change the structure of the current system to ensure
restorative opportunities for all parties. Healthcare providers still are
afforded little or no opportunity to discuss and learn from errors (arguably
there is more incentive not to discuss errors in the short-term), and patients
and the community have no greater reasons for trusting doctors and
128 See, e.g., id. at 458.
129 Chandler Gregg, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No Answer?, 70 Mo. L.
REv. 307, 325 (2005).
130 id.
131 Id. at 326. Alternatively, it may encourage some plaintiffs' attorneys to sue for much more
than their client needs in order to ensure legal fees are covered.
132 Zeiler, supra note 121, at 389-90 (also noting evidence that physicians react to other financial
incentives in a similar fashion).
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hospitals. In short, current "fixes" fail to produce better results with
respect to any of the components of the healing-centered framework. 1
33
B. Alternative Processes-Arbitration and Mediation
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has often been proposed, and
used, in the medical malpractice context. ADR covers a range of methods
which can be thought of as having at least one unifying characteristic-that
is, to varying degrees they offer a less restrictive forum than traditional tort
litigation, alleviating constraints imposed by precedent and procedural
rules. That said, ADR methods differ greatly from each other, as
evidenced in this section's examination of two prominent approaches-
arbitration and mediation.
For years, healthcare facilities have used arbitration to resolve medical
malpractice cases, although the number of claims handled through
arbitration remains relatively low. 134 In arbitration, the parties agree to use
an arbitrator, instead of a judge or jury, to issue a decision on the merits of
their case.'3 5 The decision is binding on the parties with limited or no right
to appeal. In the arbitration context, the parties have significant power to
agree on the particulars of the arbitration procedure, including the
hearing's length, number of arbitrators, arbitrators' qualifications, and the
amount of discovery permitted. 36 Arbitration typically does not alter the
basic tort theory of liability, thus the parties must still prove their cases
under the applicable substantive law.'
37
Proponents of arbitration maintain that it is a useful alternative for
resolving medical malpractice conflicts because of the "parties' ability to
control the procedure, the ability to select the arbitrator or expert, reduced
cost, shortened time to resolve the dispute, finality of the decision, privacy,
reduced emotional trauma of litigation, and self autonomy through the
ability to contract and resolve disputes outside of the courts."' 38 There is
value in many of these "benefits": a 1992 General Accounting Office
(GAO) study of medical malpractice litigation found that arbitration
resulted in some reductions in the time it took to resolve claims, was more
133 In addition, current reform measures reduce the power of individual plaintiffs-particularly
those with limited resources-and curtail judicial discretion, which potentially undermines faith in the
judicial system.
134 Nevers, supra note 124, at 50. See also Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of
Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 203, 204 (1996).
"' Metzloff, supra note 134, at 204.
136 id.
3 Id. at 204-05.
138 Nevers, supra note 124, at 49.
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effective in compensating a greater number of plaintiffs for their injuries,
and produced lower and more consistent awards.
39
Others have suggested mediation as an appropriate alternative dispute
resolution mechanism. "Mediation is based on three-core principles: party
autonomy, informed decision making, and confidentiality."'' 40 It involves a
negotiation between the concerned parties facilitated by a neutral third
party. 14  The mediator does not have independent authority to impose a
resolution; rather, he or she is tasked with guiding the parties to a
mutually-acceptable resolution. 42 As mediation is voluntary, either party
can walk away from or reject the proposed final resolution. If agreement is
reached, however, it is typically memorialized in a binding agreement.
Proponents of mediation suggest that it is the best alternative to the
current medical malpractice liability system because it results in fewer
large jury verdicts and reduces the amount of time, money and emotional
capital spent in litigation. 43  Moreover, mediation can be structured to
allow more open dialogue between physician and patient about medical
decisions and any errors.'44
Under a healing-centered framework analysis, both arbitration and
mediation offer more benefits than current tort reform proposals, yet each
method in its current form falls short of providing a comprehensive
solution to the medical malpractice crisis. Under current arbitration and
mediation programs, patient compensation may improve somewhat (with
seemingly greater potential in mediation), but many patients who suffer an
adverse event as a result of medical intervention still will receive no
compensation. As arbitration relies on the same tort law standards for
determining liability and provides limited or no opportunity for a plaintiff
to appeal an arbitrator's ruling, it does not appear to reduce doctors' and
hospitals' incentive to engage in risk management (rather than error
139 Id. at 50 (relying on U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION 9 (1992), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d3ltl0/145592.pdf).
140 NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO
SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS 9 (2004).
141 Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate
the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907, 919 (1999).
142 ld.
143 Taylor, supra note 6, at 350-51. See also Nevers, supra note 124, at 87-88 (outlining
advantages for both parties in utilizing mediation in medical malpractice cases). There are different
mediation styles, including evaluative, facilitative, and transformative. Evaluative mediators identify
strengths and weaknesses in each side's case and often predict for the parties the outcome if it went to
litigation. In contrast, facilitative mediators see their job as simply helping the parties resolve their
dispute without evaluating each side's case. Finally, transformative mediation focuses on empowering
the parties and restoring relationships through the mediation process. See Zena D. Zumeta, Styles of
Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative, and Transformative Mediation (2000), available at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/zumeta.cfm. The discussion of mediation herein focuses on the latter
two methods.
144 Taylor, supra note 6, at 351.
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reduction) and admit no wrongdoing. 4  This, in turn, frustrates doctors'
and hospitals' learning and fails to optimize safety promotion. Mediation's
facilitative or transformative process and its confidential nature allows for
greater openness and thus, hopefully, subsequent improvements in
standards of care. Given the voluntary nature of mediation, litigation
remains a threat, and thus healthcare providers still have some incentive to
pick and choose how accommodating they will be in particular cases.
Moreover, mediation does not ensure that lessons learned in a particular
case reach other healthcare providers.
Both methods offer some potential in terms of harm reduction.
Mediation, especially transformative-styled mediation, appears to offer
greater hope for creating a forum in which patients can receive information
and apologies to help foster emotional healing. In contrast, it is
questionable whether arbitration particularly helps minimize suffering.
Many question whether patients fully understand provider contracts that
make arbitration mandatory, and some have suggested that such
agreements are entered into under potentially coercive circumstances.
46
Moreover, many of the so-called benefits of arbitration-including the
parties' ability to control the procedure, the ability to select the arbitrator
or expert, and greater self autonomy through the ability to contract and
resolve disputes outside the courts-mean little to individual plaintiffs
injured during the course of medical treatment. These decisions are made
by attorneys, giving patients no greater sense of empowerment or control
over the process. Both arbitration and mediation may help reduce the time
it takes to resolve claims, though the non-binding aspect of mediation
leaves open the possibility that lengthy litigation could follow if a
resolution is not achieved. Finally, mediation appears to offer greater hope
than arbitration that all participants will be satisfied with the outcome.
It is unclear whether arbitration, as it is currently used in medical
cases, fosters an environment in which doctors and hospitals feel
comfortable sharing information openly with patients. Conversely, "[t]he
fact that mediation communications are confidential makes more open, less
14' Arbitration also suffers from the "repeat player" problem, which favors large health care
providers, giving them less incentive to disclose errors. See Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost:
An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 777, 786 (2003) (the "repeat player" effect occurs when
"repeat players repeatedly select favorite arbitrators, who then return the favor with biased decisions in
favor of the repeat players").
'4 See Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 24 A.L.R.5th I
(1994); see also Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (provider
contract held invalid because it was a contract of adhesion which mandated arbitration of malpractice
claims and required patient to waive right to jury trial); Forehand, supra note 141, at 914 (reporting on
Kaiser Permanente's attempt to mandate binding arbitration for all patient malpractice claims, which
the California courts struck down because Kaiser's system was "adversarial and biased in favor of
Kaiser... [and] 'unconscionable').
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strategic communications possible because parties need not fear that what
they say then will come back to haunt them in a later proceeding."'' 47 In
mediation, patients, doctors and hospitals can gain access to valuable
information.148  With respect to physician-to-physician information
exchange, neither method necessarily results in greater information flow,
especially with respect to transfer of learning from one healthcare facility
to another.
Finally, restorative opportunities differ under arbitration and
mediation. Arbitration, with its use of traditional tort liability standards,
limited appeals process, and its repeat player problem and other power
imbalance issues, does not appear that well positioned to ensure a positive
practice environment in which doctors can discuss errors, learn, and
improve their practices. From the patient and community perspective,
unless there is clear incentive for truthfulness on the part of doctors and
hospitals, arbitration offers little advantage over traditional malpractice
litigation for reducing mistakes and ensuring better care and thus little
encouragement for greater faith in the health care system. In contrast,
mediation offers a better forum for open dialogue that can foster restorative
opportunities.
C. Expanding Coverage-No-Fault and Enterprise Liability
While ADR focuses on providing alternative processes for resolving
cases, other approaches stress the need to increase the number of injured
individuals covered by any scheme that addresses medical error. No-fault
liability and enterprise liability systems are two models aimed at ensuring
compensation for a greater number of individuals.
Some medical malpractice scholars have advanced a no-fault or strict
liability system as the answer to the medical malpractice crisis. 49 Under a
no-fault regime, injured patients receive compensation without the
traditionally required finding of physician negligence. 5 ° Patients must
show only that they have been injured, that the injury is due to their
medical care, and that the injury meets the established compensation
criteria.1 51 The emphasis is placed on compensation whenever there is an
"undesirable outcome due to medical intervention" rather than the presence
of a negligent act.) 2 Proponents of the no-fault system often point to theworkers compensation scheme as an example of a successful no-fault
47 Liebman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 29.148 Id.
149 See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1626 (2002).
:s0 See Gregg, supra note 129, at 332.
' David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-Fault"
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 228 (2001).
152 Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps on
Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005).
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scheme."' Of existing alternatives, a no-fault liability system offers the
greatest potential for meeting the first objective of the healing-centered
framework.1
54
With respect to safety promotion, it is unclear whether no-fault
provides incentives for improved care, and thus a reduction in medical
error. A no-fault system would not provide any deterrence of negligent
acts by physicians.155  On the other hand, doctors have concerns that
hospitals and insurance companies would monitor doctors more closely in
an effort to reduce adverse events requiring payouts, leaving doctors less
freedom in their practice. 156  Still, proponents of a no-fault system argue
that doctors benefit by not being stigmatized by malpractice claims and
determinations of negligence against them. 1
57
By itself, however, no-fault does not address the patient issues of
emotional healing, and thus it would not necessarily produce optimal
results with regard to harm reduction. However, a no-fault system should
produce more efficient resolution of claims, minimizing to some extent
suffering endured by patients. It is unclear, though, whether a no-fault
system would result in more open discussion of medical errors or foster
greater information exchange. 158  Finally, assuming a no-fault system
would operate similar to the workers compensation scheme, it may provide
little or no forum for restoring the relationships that are so integral to
health care.' 59
Like no-fault liability, enterprise liability seeks to ensure greater
coverage for individuals deserving of compensation. However, unlike no-
"' See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 151, at 228-29.
15' Given no-fault's expanded compensation coverage, one major concern is its affordability.
Proponents point to cost-savings due to reduced litigation expense as a major benefit, noting that some
of those funds could be used to compensate those who would otherwise go without any recovery. See
Gregg, supra note 129, at 332. However, there are concerns regarding a move to a no-fault system,
including the potential growth in compensatory payouts because of the sheer number of injuries that
occur each year during medical treatment. See LAW & POLAN, supra note 6, at 152 ("The
overwhelming likelihood is that no-fault medical insurance would be astronomically more expensive
than malpractice liability insurance."). But see Studdert & Brennan, supra note 151, at 233 (finding
that a no-fault scheme would not cost substantially more than the tort system but would compensate
four to six times the number of patients); Weiler, supra note 96, at 227 (arguing that it would "add just
a tiny fraction to our constantly surging $1.4 trillion health care budget (some part of which is already
spent to give the additional care needed by medically injured patients)" (internal citation omitted)).
155 See LAW & POLAN, supra note 6, at 155-56 (expressing concern over a lack of deterrence
effect under no-fault models); Nevers, supra note 124, at 48.
156 See Ken Marcus Gatter, The Continued Existence and Benefit of Medicine's Autonomous Law
in Today's Health Care System, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215,254 n.205 (1999).
157 See Gregg, supra note 129, at 332.
1s See PA. JOINT STATE GOV'T COMM'N, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REFORM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: A REVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrrrEE ON MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 60 (2005).
159 Another consideration with respect to feasibility of a no-fault system is patient consent and the
validity of the forfeiture of patients' future rights in order to recover within the system. See Studdert &
Brennan, supra note 151, at 235.
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fault, enterprise liability utilizes the same liability requirements of the
negligence-based medical malpractice litigation system, only it restricts
liability to hospitals and other health care facilities. 60  At present,
"hospitals can be held liable for physician negligence when physicians are
held out as hospital employees.' 161 Under enterprise liability schemes,
hospitals would be "the exclusive bearers of medical liability for all
malpractice claims brought by hospitalized patients-regardless of the
provider's status as employee, independent contractor, or holder of
admitting privileges, and regardless of the site of the provider's
malpractice.' 62
Enterprise liability could help ensure that a greater number of patients
receive compensation. Yet, because it draws upon the same tort liability
standards, its compensation rates may or may not be significantly better
than the current system (it simply may change the defendants in
malpractice cases). Proponents of enterprise liability argue that one of its
significant benefits is that it removes blame from individual doctors,
encouraging candor about mistakes. This might help hospitals in internal
reviews of errors and lead to improved practices. However, it is unclear
what incentive hospitals have to share information about errors with
patients.
Like other tort liability approaches, enterprise liability raises concerns
that it will favor risk reduction over error reduction in certain instances,
only at the institutional level. Harm reduction may not be achieved either,
as enterprise liability does little to address emotional healing and may or
may not result in more efficient resolution of claims or patient satisfaction
with the resolution process. And with questions surrounding hospitals'
willingness to disclose information and the potential lack of reduction in
medical errors, enterprise liability may produce limited gains in terms of
fostering information exchange or enabling restorative opportunities that
heal parties and relationships.
D. Increasing Expertise-Screening Panels & Medical Courts
Other proponents of reform suggest that medical malpractice issues
may be addressed by increasing the level of expertise of those assessing
malpractice claims. Two models have been suggested: screening panels
and medical courts.
16o See HEALTH-CARE LAW AND ETHICs 458 (Mark A. Hall et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003).
161 Kristie Tappan, Note, Medical-Malpractice Reform: Is Enterprise Liability or No-Fault a
Better Reform, 46 B.C. L. REv. 1095, 1104 (2005).
162 Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the
American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REv. 381, 393 (1994).
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Medical screening panels are used to review the merits of a medical
malpractice claim before it is filed.163  They aim to eliminate frivolous
claims and encourage settlement of claims with little merit.' 64 Thirty-one
states have adopted some form of screening panels, but only twenty states
still have such systems; in the other states, provisions creating medical
screening panels were repealed or invalidated. 65  Thus, in at least certain
forms, screening panels have run afoul of constitutional protections. 66
While screening panels may reduce the number of claims that proceed to
trial, they do not do anything to ensure all meritorious claims are
discovered and brought. 1
67
From the patients' perspective, screening panels are yet another hurdle
to overcome before relief can be obtained, further frustrating opportunities
for compensation. Screening panels do not offer any greater incentive for
healthcare providers to encourage error reduction, nor do they address
patients' emotional healing needs. Assuming a patient successfully passes
the screening panel stage, he or she must still proceed with litigation in
order to obtain compensation. As such, screening panels may extend legal
battles and prolong suffering. Moreover, screening panels do not provide
much relief to healthcare providers, offering little incentive to share
information or to create a better environment for learning from medical
errors and improving practice. 68 Finally, from the community perspective,
panels may result in some cost savings (precisely how much is unclear).
As important, however, screening panels do not do anything to restore the
community's trust in doctors and hospitals and instead may suggest to the
public that there are additional barriers to truth and compensation.
163 See Gregg, supra note 129, at 327. For an example of such a panel, in the form of a tribunal,
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (2000).
164 Gregg, supra note 129, at 327.
165 Struve, supra note 43, at 990.
166 Panel provisions have been struck down in Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980) (invalidating panel system because it
violated the due process clauses of the U.S. and Florida Constitutions); Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d
763, 770-71 (Il1. 1986) (invalidating subsequent panel provision on similar grounds); Wright v. Cent.
Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-40 (I11. 1976) (invalidating panel provision because it
mixed lay and judicial functions in violation of state constitution); Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. v.
Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979) (holding that panel provision violated state constitutional
right of access to courts); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980) (struck down panel
system because it resulted in such delays as to violate state constitutional right to a jury trial); Hoem v.
State, 756 P.2d 780, 783 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that panel provision violated state constitutional
guarantee of equal protection).
167 See Struve, supra note 43, at 994-95 (discussing the reluctance of many doctors to label the
treatment decisions of other doctors as negligent).
168 Screening panels may give healthcare providers some comfort that they will face fewer
frivolous claims. However, as the vast majority of victims of medical error never bring claims, it
seems the overall positive impact of screening panels may be minimal, while their potential negative
effects could be significant.
2006]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
More recently, there have been some calls for specialized courts to
handle medical claims. The organization Common Good is one of the
leading proponents of medical courts, arguing that judges with special
expertise will be better positioned to handle medical cases. 69 Potential
benefits of medical courts include "expertise, decision making speed, and
uniformity and coherence of doctrine.' 170  Medical court judges would
have greater incentive to develop expertise in the field, and may be better
positioned to evaluate the qualifications of "expert" witnesses.' 7' One
significant concern however, is that, as such specialized courts would be
established at the state level, judges may be elected, rather than appointed,
and subject to great pressure from special interest groups. 72
Similar to other reform measures, the medical courts approach offers
hope that frivolous cases can be minimized. However, it remains unclear
whether such courts will offer a better, more accessible forum for the many
injured patients who do not bring claims under the current system.
Consequently, medical courts might fall short of realizing the
compensation objective of the healing-centered framework. That said, for
those patients who successfully litigate claims in medical courts, the
expertise of specialized courts offers hope that compensation will more
accurately reflect patients' needs.
Medical courts would operate using the same tort law standards as
traditional courts, albeit with a higher level of specialized expertise, and
thus healthcare providers would still be subject to the same pressures that
exist within the traditional medical malpractice litigation scheme.
Consequently, many of the same concerns remain-that risk reduction
would trump error reduction, harm reduction would not be fully realized,
disincentives for information sharing would persist, and restorative
opportunities would be lacking.
V. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE LESSONS
One theme that emerges from a review of the current reform measures
and alternatives is that each really targets a narrow set of problems. 17 As a
16 9 See COMMON GOOD, AN URGENT CALL FOR SPECIALIZED HEALTH COURTS (2005), available
at http://cgood.org/brochure-hcare.html.
1
70 See Struve, supra note 43, at 998.
171 Id.
171 Id. at 998-99.
173 Most patients injured by medial error do not even pursue a claim. See supra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text.
174 Other alternatives not discussed in detail here have similar shortcomings. For example,
experience-rating doctors-an approach that links the doctor's insurance premium to her risk of being
sued based on her track record-is premised on the assumption that the majority of negligent acts are
attributable to a few "bad" doctors and driven by the phenomenon of doctors leaving certain "high-
risk" specialties due to higher insurance premiums. See Gregg, supra note 129, at 330-31. Experience
rating doctors may enable "good" doctors to obtain some relief from high insurance premiums.
However, because doctors may be deemed "bad" merely because a medical mistake occurs on their
watch, their incentive not to discuss errors increases. Experience rating's "benefit" to patients-that
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result, none of them presents a comprehensive answer to the problem of
medical error. Rather than look for additional stopgap measures, the
medico-legal community (and patients) would be better served by utilizing
the healing-centered framework to guide the development of a
comprehensive response to medical error. In working to develop a better
system, restorative justice offers valuable lessons.
Therefore, this section draws upon the discourse on restorative justice
to fashion a new model to address medical errors that meets the objectives
of the healing-centered framework and honors the core values of medicine.
Restorative justice provides a useful parallel, because it is an alternative
model (developed in the criminal justice setting) that seeks healing of all
concerned parties including the community.175  For that reason, it is a
useful starting point for developing a solution to the problem of medical
error.
A. A Preliminary Note
As restorative justice is a criminal justice mechanism, this discussion
necessarily draws upon criminal cases, many of which involve violent acts
against innocent victims (especially the human rights examples). It is
important to acknowledge this fundamental distinction between restorative
justice models and medical malpractice claims, which involve civil
lawsuits. In the vast majority of cases, the acts committed by doctors are
mistakes-typically either genuine accidents or a result of negligence or,
on occasion, reckless behavior-and are not purposeful or criminal. 176 In
looking to restorative justice, my purpose is to examine whether elements
of that model can help guide the medico-legal community toward a
solution for the medical malpractice crisis. In no way should my use of
restorative justice suggest that errors by doctors in the ordinary course of
their professional lives rise to the level of criminal acts. Equally important,
in drawing upon restorative justice examples including the South African
they will be able to identify good and bad doctors-is also suspect, as most patients have limited choice
in doctors due to geographic constraints and limitations imposed by health insurance plans. Moreover,
if the system encourages doctors not to admit mistakes, patients will be less likely to receive the
apologies or information about their treatment necessary for emotional healing to occur.
175 Tom Porter, Circles of Conversations: One Trial Lawyer's Journey into Sacred Spaces, DiSP.
RESOL. MAG., Apr. 2004, at 7, 8. While this Article focuses on restorative justice's potential
contributions to medical malpractice law, there are other legal approaches that emphasize healing,
including therapeutic jurisprudence, collaborative law, holistic law, transformative alternative dispute
resolution and others. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 17-19 (1991); J. Kim Wright & Dolly M. Garlo, Law as a Healing Profession, 63 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 9, 9 (2003); Susan Daicoff, Brief Description of the Vectors of the Comprehensive Law
Movement and the Points of Intersection (2000), http://users.law.capital.edu/sdaicoff/vectors I .htm.
176 In extreme cases, physicians can be tried by the state for criminal acts related to their practice
of medicine. Those cases are the exception, not the rule, and are not the focus of the various tort
reform efforts of Congress and the states. Accordingly, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
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experience, in no way do I intend to minimize the suffering of victims of
gross human rights violations or other crimes.
177
Despite the differences in the underlying acts, I believe that the
principles of restorative justice have application in the medical setting.
The physician-patient relationship is founded on care, and thus the gap to
be bridged in this context is much smaller than the gulf between the
perpetrator of violence and victim.' 78 Therefore, if restorative justice can
be successful in cases of brutal torture and other human rights abuses
where reconciliation would seem impossible, then restorative justice
principles should have something to offer in the context of a physician-
patient relationship damaged by medical error.
B. Principles of Restorative Justice
Restorative justice is a method of resolving criminal justice disputes
which aims to "repair the harm that a criminal offense inflicts on victims,
offenders, and communities."' 179  Restorative justice models have been
developed as an alternative to the retributive justice model, which defines
crime primarily as "an act against the state.' 80  Because the retributive
justice model sees crime as only a violation of state law, its response is
limited to the state punishing the offender. Victims and the community
have no real role in this process, other than perhaps testifying at trial or
serving on the jury. Governments that rely on the theory of retributive
justice do so in part because of their view that such crime control measures
will have a deterrent effect.' 8' In similar fashion, many proponents of the
medical malpractice litigation system argue that the threat of lawsuits puts
pressure on hospitals and medical professionals to reduce the occurrence of
177 A second key difference is the influence of political concerns. The new South African
government's decision to establish a truth commission, rather than to hold criminal trials, was
influenced greatly by the political landscape of the day, as well as the fragility of democracy
immediately following the country's first free elections. South Africa's Constitutional Court
acknowledged this in ruling on a challenge to the amnesty provision of the Truth and Reconciliation
Act, pointing to language in the interim Constitution which stated that the "Constitution provides a
historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold
suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and
peaceful coexistence." Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of the Republic of S. Africa 1996 (4) SA 671
(CC) at 676-77 (S. Afr.). Ultimately, the Court held that the amnesty provision was "specifically
authorised for the purposes of effecting a constructive transition towards a democratic order." Id. at
691. While medical malpractice reform is highly politicized, pressures on malpractice decisions do not
rise to the level of amnesty decisions in emerging democracies. Theoretically, without such pressure, it
should be easier in the medical malpractice setting to address the real problems.
178 The intimacy of a physician-patient relationship may mean that some injured patients feel
particularly betrayed or violated; however, I suggest that such feelings, while important, do not present
as significant an obstacle as confronting an individual who tortured one's family members.
171 STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 1. See also Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, An International
"'Truth Commission": Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 213 (2003).
180 Eisnaugle, supra note 179, at 213 (citation omitted).
181 See id.
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negligent acts. As discussed above, the medical malpractice litigation
system's ability to do this has proven inadequate.
In contrast to retributive justice models, restorative justice requires the
involvement of all parties-the victim, the offender and the community.
Restorative justice has been defined as follows:
[A] justice that focuse[s] ... on harm and addressing the
harm, first to victims, then to the community as a whole, and
finally to the offender as well. This justice involve[s] ...
accountability, real accountability, where the person who
created the harm [is] ... involved with the victims and the
community in determining how to address the harm and
make things right.1
82
Restorative justice is different in that it brings together individuals who
have been affected by a crime with the goal of having them agree on how
to address the harm done by the crime.
183
Described as "a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a
particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with
the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future,"'
184
restorative justice asks the following: "Who has been hurt? What do they
need? Whose obligations and responsibilities are these? Who has a stake
in this situation? What is the process that can involve the stakeholders in
finding a solution?"'
85
Restorative justice sees crime as a "violation of people and of
interpersonal relationships."'186  It encompasses a range of practices and
processes which are aimed at empowering victims, offenders, and
communities to "redress the material, psychological and relational harms
generated by crimes."' 87 In this sense, restorative justice is "less about
punishing people and more about achieving a presumed relational
182 Porter, supra note 175, at 8. See also Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice:
Friend or Foe? A Systematic Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667,
670 (2005) (discussing principles and definitions of restorative justice).
183 See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743-44 (1999).
184 Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, in 31 YOUTH CRIME AND YOUTH JUSTICE:
COMPARATIVE AND CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 543, 552 (2004) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
185 HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITrLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 63 (2002).
1861d. at 19.
187 GEORGE PAVLICH, GOVERNING PARADOXES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 2 (2005).
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equilibrium."'' 8 8 That said, restoring relationships does not necessarily
mean complete elimination of punishment for the offender.
89
Restorative justice models may include programs that provide
restorative processes, restorative outcomes, or both.190 Many different
methods fall under the. rubric of restorative justice, including victim-
offender mediation, victim-offender panels, victim and community impact
statements, family or community group counseling, and truth and
reconciliation commissions. 191 They offer a range of benefits that are
worth exploring in the context of developing medical malpractice reform.
C. Benefits of a Restorative Model
The holistic nature of restorative justice offers a number of potential
benefits for victims, offenders and the community, as compared to the
traditional retributive justice model. 92
1. Providing for Victims
Strang and Sherman identify five elements that victims of crimes want
the criminal justice system to provide: information; an opportunity to
participate; emotional restoration and apology; material reparation; and
fairness and respect. 193 These benefits for victims, and others provided to
offenders and the community, parallel much of what the healing-centered
framework aims to provide in the health care context.
Information. Victims report that one of the greatest sources of
frustration is not being able to get information about what is happening or
has happened to their cases. 94 Restorative justice provides an opportunity
... Id. at 29.
189 See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 303, 303 (2003) ("[R]estorative justice does not, despite what its proponents say, really insist on
the total elimination of punishment.").
190 Examples of programs offering restorative processes include victim offender
mediation/reconciliation, family group conferences, victim-offender panels, sentencing circles, and
community crime prevention; whereas programs that provide restorative outcomes include restitution,
community service, victim support services, victim compensation programs, and rehabilitation
programs for offenders. Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10
REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 54 (1998).
191 See STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 9-12.
192 Restorative justice models are not free of challenges; they do not always achieve full success.
For example, in a minority of cases, victims report feeling upset by something that the offender said in
group conferences. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 49
(2002). While understanding the reasons behind less successful restorative processes is important, I
look to restorative justice to draw upon its principles. As such, in-depth analysis of the shortcomings
of each of the myriad of different restorative justice options is beyond the scope of this Article. For
more on the limitations of restorative justice, see, for example, DECLAN ROCHE, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 12-18, 33-41 (2003); Andrew von Hirsch et al., Specifying Aims and Limits for
Restorative Justice: A 'Making Amends' Model?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 21, 21-24, 31-38 (Andrew Von Hirsh et al. eds., 2003).
'93 Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 20-25.
'" Id. at 20.
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for dialogue so that the victim has access to the information he/she wants
or needs as part of the process of coming to terms with what has occurred.
Similarly, in the medical error context, lack of information is also
frequently one of the primary sources of frustration for patients, leading
many to instigate legal actions as a means of uncovering information. 95
An approach that maintains an open dialogue-fostering information
exchange between physicians and patients-would help ensure that
patients receive the information they need without having to resort to
litigation.
Participation. Research on victims' views reveals that many victims
report frustration at having no voice in criminal law proceedings and no
opportunity to participate. 196 Heather Strang explains that "the formality of
the justice system, where victims have no opportunity for input beyond
their role as prosecution witnesses-and not even that in those cases where
the defendant pleads guilty-is a source of frustration and anger for many
victims. ' '197 Lack of a meaningful role, or any role at all, leaves victims
feeling powerless and without control over their own cases. 198 As the
majority of cases result in plea bargains in the traditional criminal justice
model victims may never have an opportunity to confront their offenders at
trial, often an important step in understanding and coming to terms with
their experience.' 99 When victims have a forum to express their views and
feel that their desires are not ignored, they express greater satisfaction with
the criminal justice system.200  Restorative justice models create a forum
for meaningful participation by victims.
20 1
In the medical malpractice context, similar concerns exist for injured
patients. "Frequently, in the context of modem medical facilities, the
patient's voice is muted, if not lost, and the patient's ability to vindicate his
195 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Patients often resort to litigation, in the words
of Nancy Berlinger, as an "act of detection" because they cannot obtain information from their doctors.
Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution, Honolulu, HI, Resolving Complex Health Disputes, ADR
TIMES, Spring 2005, at 6, available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/2E4E92Al9A3C8A
30EDCB95EBOF/Spring2005.pdf (quoting Nancy Berlinger).
196 See, e.g., HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 8-10
(2002).
'9' Id. at 10.
'9' STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 38.
19 Id.
200 STRANG, supra note 196, at 10.
201 See, e.g., Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, Restorative Conferencing, in RESTORATIVE
COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 173, 175 (Gordon
Bazemore & Maria Schiff eds., 2001) ("Restorative conferencing, then, gives the state a diminished
role and locates crime-and responses to it-with these 'communities of care.'"). Morris and Maxwell
note restorative conferencing's emphasis not just on bringing victim and offender together, but also on
ensuring both participate meaningfully in the meeting. Id. at 179 ("The key issue is not simply
presence at a meeting, but inclusion in that meeting.").
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or her interests is overpowered., 20 2  Being ill or injured is very
disempowering. 2°3  Patients who have lived independently for decades
suddenly must rely on doctors or nurses to assist them with life's most
basic tasks. When a course of treatment fails to work as anticipated,
patients are even more disillusioned. Providing a process in which patients
can regain some sense of personal empowerment can help address these
concerns.
Emotional restoration and apology. Research reveals that most
victims of crimes do not want to seek vengeance.2 ° Some feel anger and
initially want vengeance, but most do not.205 Perhaps even more
remarkable is that similar sentiments are expressed in the truth and
reconciliation context, following commission of some of the most heinous
crimes. Confronting the atrocities committed by the apartheid government
in South Africa and brutal regimes in other countries, many victims and
family members emphasize foremost the importance of knowing what
happened to their loved ones °.2 06 These findings suggest that victims want
the emotional aspects of their suffering addressed, and not merely
punishment of the offender.
The criminal justice system has often ignored emotional and
psychological aspects of the loss suffered by victims.2 07  Victimology
literature says little about victims' need or desire for apologies from
offenders.0 Restorative justice aims to incorporate these dimensions into
the criminal justice process to provide full healing for victims.
Expressions of remorse and sincere apologies can help alleviate the
victim's suffering.20 9
Restorative justice models make the apology a key component of the
victim-offender dialogue.210 In Japan, apologies have long been a part of
the criminal justice system.2 1' Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur Rosett
report that the apology can serve three functions: (1) it demonstrates that
202 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 140, at 11.
203 See id. ("The physical and emotional stress of serious illness also contributes to an uneven
playin1field..").
Strang & Sherman, supra note 193, at 18.
205 id.
206 See JEFFREY SARKIN, CARROTS AND STICKS: THE TRC AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMNESTY
PROCESS 7 (2004) (noting that 76% of black South Africans "strongly or moderately approved of the
work of the TRC" which placed a premium on truth and granted amnesty to some perpetrators in
return); see also BRANDON HAMBER ET AL., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION
& KHULUMANI SUPPORT GROUP, SURVIVORS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FINAL REPORT (1998), http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/
papkhul.htm. See generally MARTHA MtNOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
207 Strang & Sherman, supra note 193, at 22.
20 id.
209 See ROCHE, supra note 192, at 9.
210 Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81
B.U. L. REv. 289, 291 (2001).
211 Id. at 298.
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the offender feels remorse, (2) it shows the intent of the offender to
compensate the victim, and (3) if the apolofy is accepted, it helps restore
harmony between the victim and offender. Closer to home, a study of
programs in Indiana found that victims appreciated "the expression of
remorse on the part of the offender" and offenders valued the opportunity
to "mak[e] things right., 21 3 In other research, victims reported that the
mediation process, which included an apology by the perpetrator, offered
"a chance for healing; a chance for information sharing; a chance for
building relationships instead of destroying them[.], 214
Certainly the value of building instead of destroying relationships is at
least equally important to individuals in the physician-patient context. At a
time when apologies are becoming a growing part of public discourse
related to gross human rights violations, there remains significant
reluctance simply to say "I'm sorry" in the context of medical mistake.
215
How is it that truth and reconciliation commissions can enable apologies in
the context of torture, killings, and other crimes against humanity, but
doctors, who are already engaged in a care relationship, remain hesitant to
connect on a human level by apologizing to patients?
One reason, as discussed above, is that doctors have been taught that
an apology suggests an admission of responsibility, a step which does not
make for good results in litigation. A number of states have recognized the
value of apologies. and amended their rules of evidence to exempt
statements or gestures expressing sympathy or a sense of benevolence from
being admitted as an admission of guilt by a party in a civil suit.
216
However, in numerous jurisdictions, apologies are still viewed as
suggesting an admission of responsibility. Unfortunately, the lack of an
apology deprives the injured patient of an important element in the healing
process. Failure to apologize is often viewed by patients as an inability to
empathize with the patient's plight. It leaves the patient without any
212 See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 461,469, 472, 477 (1986).
213 MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND
MEDIATION 17-19 (1994) (reporting the findings of a study in Indiana by Robert Coates and John
Gehm).
214 Latif, supra note 210, at 294 (quoting Umbreit, supra note 213, at 95).
2 3 See id. at 289-90 (discussing apologies as being an "international method of restitution"); see
also LAZARE, supra note 74, at 5-8 (finding a rise in public apologies in recent years).
216 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2000) (rendering inadmissible "[sitatements,
writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence.., as evidence
of an admission of liability in a civil action"); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(a)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 2005) (rendering inadmissible "a communication that ... expresses sympathy or a
general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of an individual involved in an
accident"); Assembly 2804, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (same). See supra note 80 for a list of other
states that provide exceptions for apologies in the medical error context.
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feeling of caring from the one individual who is supposed to care-one's
doctor.
217
Material reparation. Victims of crime suffer bodily injuries as well as
economic loss. Compensation remains an important element in ensuring
the full healing of victims. Restorative justice utilizes two approaches-
compensation funds and restitution.1 8  Victim compensation funds
typically are established by governments to cover medical expenses
incurred by victims due to injuries suffered, as well as losses in earnings
for missed work while recuperating. 219 Restitution requires offenders to
pay money to victims to cover losses suffered as a result of the crimes and
is more common in property crimes.220 Contrary perhaps to popular belief,
material reparation is not necessarily the most important component;
victims who participate in restorative processes still report high levels of
satisfaction even when compensation is relatively small. 221
In the medical error context, patients have suffered injuries as a result
of substandard care. Medical bills for subsequent care can be very high,
and lost wages and other costs can be substantial. As a result, material
compensation is, and must continue to be, an important part of any
resolution of medical malpractice disputes, but it must not be the only step.
Fairness and respect. Finally, research reveals that the primary factor
influencing victims' satisfaction with the justice system is their sense of
fairness of the process, rather than the specific outcome. 222 Victims most
want a voice in the process and an opportunity to be heard but do not
expect that they will have control over the outcome.223
In the medical malpractice context, patients typically do not sue
doctors when they feel their doctors have been honest, have treated them
with respect, and have tried to achieve the best possible outcome for them.
Conversely, feeling wronged often leads patients to sue doctors in the
hopes of achieving some sense of fairness.
217 Having an opportunity to apologize is also important in the healing process of offenders in the
criminal context and healthcare providers in medical malpractice cases.
218 STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 48.
2 19 
id.
220 Id. at 49.
221 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 192, at 52-53.
222 Strang & Sherman, supra note 193, at 24. See also E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Hollander-Blumoff & Brodie, supra note 30,
at 1390; Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 76-77 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 2, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1001 &context=sandiegolwps.
223 Strang & Sherman, supra note 193, at 24; Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria
Used By Citizens To Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 103, 125-27
(1988).
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2. Positive Outcomes for Offenders
The aim of restorative justice is to provide healing for the offender and
community, as well as the victim. As a result, restorative justice focuses
on "reestablishing the integrated community, rather than exacting
retribution for crimes," 224 and "promoting reconciliation and peace
between and among the affected parties is more important than
vengeance.225 In a medical care setting, a process that promotes peace
and reconciliation would fit better than one driven by vengeance.
For perpetrators of crimes, the restorative justice model differs from
the retributive justice model in one very significant way: "[b]efore any
restorative justice process can begin, offenders must take responsibility for
their offenses and admit guilt. In an adversarial process, determining guilt
is the chief goal. 226  The traditional criminal justice model provides
incentives for the defendant not to admit anything, unless a plea bargain is
offered. By having offenders accept responsibility at the outset, restorative
justice can focus on what offenders can do to make things right with the
victim and community.227
Restorative justice offers several potential benefits to offenders. In
some cases, offenders can avoid a criminal record and its corollary
punishments, such as voting and social services benefits restrictions, by
completing a restorative justice program. Restorative justice may also
enable offenders to make amends to victims, alleviating some of the guilt
they feel about the harm they inflicted.228 Offenders in Germany, for
example, reported that they appreciated the opportunity to "explain their
own behavior, apologize, ease the conscience and reduce feelings of
guilt."229 One individual stated "that it was important for him to be able to
say he was sorry and to agree to do Some restitution for the victim.
'
"
230
Many of these issues arise with doctors accused of medical
malpractice. In a traditional medical malpractice litigation scheme, the
focus is on proving the doctors' liability. By having physicians accept
responsibility at the outset for their actions, a restorative model can shift
224 STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 19.
225 Id. at 20.
226 Id. at 21. See also PAVLICH, supra note 187, at 68.
227 See PAVLICH, supra note 187, at 68.
228 Strang & Sherman, supra note 193, at 37. See also PAVLICH, supra note 187, at 70 (noting
offenders "often feel profound remorse for their behaviour and so experience a need to be held
accountable and to make things right").
229 Lutz Netzig & Thomas Trenczek, Restorative Justice as Participation: Theory, Law,
Experience and Research, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 180,
at 241,253-56.
230 Caren L. Flaten, Victim-Offender Mediation: Application with Serious Offenses Committed by
Juveniles, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTWES, supra note 180, at 387, 397-98.
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the focus to making things right for the patient, doctor, and community.23'
Using a process built on restorative principles, one could envision doctors
starting by being open about the choices they made, so that injured patients
can better understand what happened and medical professionals can review
and determine how the injury occurred and what can be done differently in
the future to avoid injuring other patients.232 This would also provide
opportunities for doctors' healing in a way that does not exist under the
current medical malpractice litigation system.
3. Positive Outcomes for Communities
The third important stakeholder in restorative justice models is the
community. The boundaries or definitions of "community" are not always
clear and may differ depending on the offender and victim. However,
generally speaking, community most frequently refers to a group of people
that share a defined geographical place.233 Frequently, the community is
not defined until the crime has been committed and it is possible to
determine who is affected by the harm.234
In the medical care setting, the community is fairly broad. Foremost, it
would include the people living in the geographic area served by the
hospital or health care facility where the medical error occurred. However,
given that advances in medical care can benefit populations far from the
places where they occur, the community which is harmed by failures to
address medical errors properly, or could benefit from a restorative
approach to medical error, is potentially very large. Once community is
defined, restorative justice models seek to ensure that the community plays
an important role in the process. Their involvement offers several potential
benefits.
231 See PAVLICH, supra note 187, at 68.
232 In fact, some hospitals have adopted policies whereby they disclose errors to patients and, in
some cases, offer some compensation. These "early offer" approaches have been successful in
reducing the number of lawsuits filed against those facilities and the average settlement amount per
claim. See, for example, the experience of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky.
Steve S. Kraman et al., John M Eisenberg Patient Safety Awards Advocacy: The Lexington Veterans
Affairs Medical Center, 28 JT. COMM. J. QUAL. IMPROV. 646 (2002). See also NANCY BERLINGER,
AFTER HARM: MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF FORGIVENESS 70 (2005) ("As of 2000, Lexington
was averaging $15,000 per settlement, compared with $98,000 for all VA hospitals."); Jonathan R.
Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1447, 1447-63 (2000); HARVARD HOSPITALS STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 6 ("Prompt,
compassionate and honest communication with the patient and family following an incident is
essential."). For another "early offer" model, see Jeffrey O'Connell & Evan Stephenson, Binding
Statutory Early Offers by Defendants, Not Plaintiffs, in Personal Injury Suits, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 233,
233 (2005) (proposing model whereby defendants can make "early offer" to pay plaintiffs net
economic costs losses as they accrue, and plaintiffs can proceed to trial only by rejecting the offer, after
which they would have to prove defendant's conduct grossly negligent beyond a reasonable doubt).
233 See PAVLICH, supra note 187, at 86; STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 87 (noting it may also
refer to a particular ethnic community).
234 See STRICKLAND, supra note 28, at 87.
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First, whereas in the traditional criminal justice model the community
is represented by the state, in the restorative justice model the community
itself plays a more active role.235 Restorative justice proponents believe
that the offender's community has the greatest influence over the offender,
and thus must be brought into the process in order to provide the best hope
of convincing the offender to try to repair the harm inflicted on the victim
and refrain from future criminal acts.236 In this regard, community in the
healthcare context incorporates two important populations-the
professional medical community and the general public. Involving the
medical community in a way that advances learning, instead of limiting the
medical community's role to expert witness testimonials, should create
better opportunities for helping doctors repair the harm caused to patients
and for avoiding future errors. Involving the general public in efforts to
improve care offers the hope of giving the public a greater voice in policies
affecting their communities.
Second, restorative justice proponents suggest that when a community
is negatively affected by a crime, it needs the opportunity to address the
crime and the issues it raises in the community. In a similar fashion,
substandard care at a medical facility has an impact on the community in
which that hospital is situated, because if it goes unremedied, all members
of the community are at risk of being injured in the future. Accordingly,
community involvement in redressing medical errors will help to restore
the trust between doctors and the communities they serve.
Third, community empowerment is another important potential benefit
of restorative justice models.237 Having greater input in forging remedies
for crimes gives the community a stake in the problem-solving process.
Finally, for the community, restorative justice means "restoring a sense of
peace and harmony or the feeling that justice has been served. 238
Restoring a sense of peace and harmony in communities where members
of the community have suffered injuries as a result of substandard medical
care is also crucial.
D. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions-The South African Example
In the past decade, new governments have turned with increasing
frequency to truth commissions as a means to address grave wrongs
committed by prior regimes and to facilitate community healing. A truth
commission is an official, non-judicial body established by a government
with the mandate of investigating and documenting human rights
235 Id. at 90.
236 Id.
237 See id. at 96.
238 Id. at 104.
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violations of prior regimes, and recommending procedures to help prevent
future human rights violations. 239 Professor Okechukwu Oko explains "a
truth commission seeks to accomplish any or all of the following
objectives: to clarify and acknowledge the truth; to respond to specific
needs of victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to outline
institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to promote
reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past.
'
,
240
The most notable recent example, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa, offers valuable insight into truth
commissions.241 In the early 1990s, as the world welcomed the end of
apartheid and South Africa's achievement of a free society, the country
faced the difficult question of how to deal with the apartheid legacy and
the terrible crimes committed against innocent civilians during the
apartheid era. The new government wanted to provide a full accounting of
the atrocities that occurred under the old regime, justice for victims and
their family members, and punishment for the apartheid leaders.242 Many
African National Congress leaders maintained that South Africa could not
fully heal itself until the perpetrators of apartheid's crimes admitted that,
despite what they believed at the time, they had come to realize that they
were wrong.243 Not surprisingly, former leaders, police, and security
officials wanted full amnesty.
244
Establishing respect for human rights and the rule of law is an
important task for any new government, and victims and their families
deserved some form of justice. South Africa thus could have elected to
seek punishment for perpetrators of such crimes in order to send a clear
message that these brutal acts cannot be tolerated under any circumstances.
However, trials for crimes against humanity threatened to divide rather
than unite the country. In addition, given the secretive nature of the
apartheid regime, practical concerns existed that the new government
might not be able to uncover evidence necessary to convict the perpetrators
of these crimes. An adversarial approach would have ensured that
members of the apartheid government and its police force would have no
incentive to offer evidence. Thus, the new South African government
faced the prospect of pursuing, but possibly failing to obtain, criminal
239 Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes: Towards a More
Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 138 (2003). See also PRISCILLA B.
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY (2001); Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARv. Hum. RTS. J. 69, 78 (2003).
24 Oko, supra note 239, at 138.
241 See id. (noting that truth commissions have also been adopted in El Salvador, Guatemala,
Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda).
242 Gwen K. Young, All the Truth and as Much Justice as Possible, 9 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 209, 222-23 (2003).2 43 PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE BIRTH OF THE
NEW SOUTH AFRICA 277 (1997).
24 Young, supra note 242, at 223.
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convictions of apartheid's worst perpetrators of human rights violations.
Would such an approach have been in the interest of the country? Would it
have been in the interests of victims' relatives, many of whom had waited
years, and even decades, to find out what happened to their loved ones?
Ultimately, South Africa answered both questions in the negative.
Therefore, rather than create a criminal court to prosecute apartheid's worst
offenders, South Africa established the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC).245
The TRC had three separate sections, the most widely publicized being
the Amnesty Commission, which offered the possibility of amnesty to
applicants who disclosed fully and truthfully the details of their crimes,
provided that they had been committed in furtherance of a political
purpose.246 The results of the TRC were not without controversy or
critics. 247 For example, some argued that "truth" came at the expense of
"justice., 248 However, the TRC achieved a number of important objectives
relevant to this discussion.
The TRC provided victims the opportunity to confront their abusers,
offered offenders the possibility of amnesty if they acknowledged their
crimes, and aimed to shed light on apartheid's secrets and establish the
truth for all people to know. Perhaps most important, after decades in
which the truth about apartheid's ruthless human rights abuses were
deliberately kept from the public, the TRC offered victims the opportunity
to have "their day in court," to tell the true story about what happened to
them or their family members. Victims were able to speak freely without
the limitations that would be imposed by court proceedings, and without
being subjected to cross-examination. 250 The TRC proceedings also
24 See, e.g., Ellen A. Waldman, Healing Hearts or Righting Wrongs?: A Meditation on the Goals
of "Restorative Justice, " 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 355, 356 (2004).
246 See Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid's Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155, 1164-65 (2004). Professor Andrews explains:
The TRC included, as part of its project, three committees: the Committee on
Human Rights Violations, which designated victim status to applicants; and the
Amnesty Committee, which granted amnesty to applicants who disclosed fully the
details of their acts that must have been committed to further a political purpose.
The third committee was the Reparations Committee, which was mandated to
explore methods and mechanisms for reparations and to advise the government as to
appropriate steps to be taken to compensate victims.
Id. See also Albie Sachs, Truth and Reconciliation, 52 SMU L. REv. 1563, 1568-69 (1999).
247 See, e.g., Eisnaugle, supra note 179, at 234-35 (citing lack of direct victim-offender dialogue
and minimal resources for reparations as problems); Brandon Hamber & Richard A. Wilson, Symbolic
Closure Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies, I J. HUM. RTS. 35, 35
(2002) (suggesting that calls for reconciliation may demand too much, too soon from survivors).
24 For a critique of truth commissions generally, see, for example, TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
249 Waldman, supra note 245, at 356-57; Peter Storey, A Different Kind of Justice: Truth and
Reconciliation in South Africa, 114 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 788, 789-93 (1997).
250 See Andrews, supra note 246, at 1162.
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eliminated technical legal rules and restrictions, such as hearsay rules in
evidence.25' This forum facilitated long awaited healing for many victims
and their family members.
In addition, victims and family members of deceased victims were able
to seek compensation with the Reparations Committee. Although the
limited funds of the Reparations Committee created concerns, victims'
requests were "remarkably modest. 2 52 As Peter Storey reported: "Mos" nf
all, the bereaved want[ed] the return and proper burial of their relatives'
remains, or a memorial in their village, or a small scholarship for orphaned
children. All agree[d] that the most important thing is to know the
truth. 253
The amnesty component of the TRC, while controversial, did not mean
impunity for offenders. Victims and family members, as well as offenders
themselves, came to see that "even with amnesty, their tormentors are
judged-that there is a difference between impunity, implying escape from
accountability, and amnesty, which carries profound inward and social
consequences.
' 254
The TRC also enabled broader community participation in the
proceedings. TRC hearings were held around the country, including in
rural community centers. It allowed for a greater sense of participation
than a single centrally-located commission would have. The TRC also
helped the new South Africa set an example for its own citizens and the
world that a healing, restorative approach can repair harms and create a
better future.
In opting for a restorative, rather than retributive, model, South Africa
demonstrated that healing is possible even under the most difficult
circumstances. In setting the example, South Africa challenges others
countries to forge new systems that provide healing and restoration in other
contexts. Health care, which is built on care relationships, would seem to
be a natural place to start.
VI. DEVELOPING A RESTORATIVE MEDICAL ERROR RESOLUTION
(R-MER) MODEL
As we have seen, one of the most problematic aspects of using an
adversarial approach in health care is that it immediately pits the injured
patient against the doctors, nurses and hospital, regardless of whether the
injury was preventable, the result of individual or systems errors, or just a
bad outcome with no error involved. Overnight, the caregiver becomes the
enemy. As with any legal proceeding, the parties are prohibited from
251 Id.
252 Storey, supra note 249, at 790.
253 Id. at 790-91.
254 Id. at 793.
255 Id. at 788-89.
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communicating directly; instead, communication occurs only through
counsel. Patients suddenly find themselves searching for a new source of
medical care at the precise time when care is needed most. Consequently,
they are left struggling to recover from or adapt to injuries while having to
establish new care relationships. Patients must face these difficult
situations, often without any explanation from their doctors or hospitals,
and must brace themselves for a legal battle that could go on for years.
Concurrently, doctors lack a forum that fosters optimal conditions for
discussing medical errors and learning from -mistakes.256 As a result, they
miss opportunities to learn and improve their skills. They are also
prevented from expressing empathy toward and continuing to care for their
injured patient. Additionally, they must practice under the constant threat
of litigation and rising insurance premiums, with little or no opportunity to
go through their own healing process after errors are made. Finally, the
current environment fails to foster trust and falls short of ensuring the best
possible care in the future for the community. I submit that a restorative
approach will produce better results, bringing us closer to fulfilling the
objectives of the healing-centered framework.
The central component of an R-MER system would be participatory
forums in which both patients and healthcare providers would have the
opportunity for open dialogue with each other, in order to gain a better
understanding of what happened and what each individual wants and/or
needs going forward. The process of determining what went wrong would
include third-party participation to ensure impartial review of cases and
address some of the inherent power imbalances between patients and
healthcare providers, but the third-party participants would not sit in
judgment. In addition to facilitating healing for the patient and healthcare
providers involved in a specific case, the R-MER forum would include in
its processes the additional component of developing recommendations for
256 Hospitals use morbidity and mortality (M&M) conferences as their primary forum for
physicians to discuss poor clinical outcomes, but many question the value of M&M conferences. See
Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, Reforming Residency: Modernizing Resident Education and Training to
Promote Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 38 J. HEALTH L. 203, 220 (2005) ("The presence of many
senior faculty members at these conferences who adhere to the traditional, individually oriented,
shame-and-blame approach may discourage open discussion among residents of the possible errors
and/or systems issues that could have resulted in the bad outcome. In these environments, medical
errors remain hidden by medical residents, and the disincentives and cultural aversion to discussing
medical errors are strongly solidified.") (internal citations omitted)); Edgar Pierluissi et al., Discussion
of Medical Errors in Morbidity and Mortality Conferences, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2838, 2838 (2003)
(reporting research findings raising doubts "whether adverse events and errors are routinely discussed
in internal medicine training programs"); Danielle Ofi, M&M, 23 Mo. REV. 37 (2000). But see
GAWANDE, supra note 83, at 62 ("[T]he M & M is an impressively sophisticated and human institution.
Unlike the courts or the media, it recognizes that human error is generally not something that can be
deterred by punishment."). Gawande concedes, however, that M&M conferences do not necessarily
optimize learning in all cases. Id. at 64.
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changes in a particular doctor's or hospital's practices or more generally in
standards of care, as well as a follow-up monitoring mechanism to ensure
that changes have been implemented and practices are improving.257 These
foundational elements must be a part of any R-MER system. Beyond that,
just as a range of restorative justice models exist, specific R-MER models
could evolve in a variety of ways (one model is offered below).
A. Advantages of R-MER
A medical malpractice liability system that has the best hope of
providing healing for all parties will: (1) provide compensation; (2)
promote safety; (3) reduce harm; (4) foster information exchange; and (5)
offer restorative opportunities for all. With respect to these goals, the R-
MER approach offers more hope than the current medical malpractice
litigation system.
First, the majority of victims receive nothing through the litigation
system while others wait years for any compensation. 218  An R-MER
model would require a shift away from protracted liability disputes toward
collaborative identification of "error" cases and determinations of
appropriate compensation. 259 The opportunity for open dialogue in an R-
MER system would improve procedures for identifying under-performing
medical professionals and facilities, with a view to improving practices and
systems rather than apportioning blame and punishment. R-MER models
could be funded through insurance, compensation funds, or some
combination of means (compensation issues are discussed in more detail
below).
Second, the current system provides more incentive for risk reduction
than error reduction. 260  The R-MER model would employ restorative
processes to ensure a dialogue that leads to identification of errors and
development of appropriate measures to prevent recurrence of such errors.
The current system leads doctors and hospitals to settle "bad outcome"
cases without any admission of fault, thus frustrating learning and
opportunities for improving standards of care. 26' The R-MER approach
requires a shift away from assigning blame for poor clinical outcomes
257 By including patients in this aspect of the process, they may achieve a greater sense of
satisfaction knowing that, while they suffered an injury, they helped develop recommendations for
protecting patients in the future.
258 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
259 Even in "bad outcome" cases, where there was no error and thus no monetary compensation is
paid, there is still value for patients and healthcare providers to participate in an R-MER forum, in
order to better understand the situation and address issues that can facilitate emotional healing.
260 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. Measures that reduce risk can reduce error in
certain instances, but a focus on risk management rather than error reduction will not necessarily lead
to improvements in care and, in fact, may increase the risk of error in certain cases.
261 Learning does occur in some cases under the current system, however an unwillingness to
admit mistakes means opportunities for learning are missed and care is not optimized.
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toward an acceptance of responsibility on the part of healthcare providers,
enabling opportunities for improvements in safety.
Third, medical malpractice lawsuits contribute to doctors' and
hospitals' reluctance to apologize, discuss mistakes, or accept
responsibility.262 Moreover, litigation often extends for years, prolonging
the suffering of patients (and healthcare providers) and delaying adoption
of policies that would avoid future harms to the community. 263  The R-
MER approach would allow medical professionals to empathize more
openly with patients, provide apologies, and attend to the emotional needs
of patients (and facilitate their own healing).26 In addition, the focus of R-
MER proceedings would be on acknowledging the harm, discussing the
causes, and developing a plan for remedial action. Done collaboratively,
this process could be far more efficient than going through years of
discovery, trials, and appeals, and it would provide all parties with a
greater sense of procedural fairness.
Fourth, the R-MER model provides an environment in which doctors
and hospitals can discuss errors more openly, learn from these mistakes,
and improve standards of care. 265 Physician-to-physician dialogue must be
truly open to optimize learning. Physician-patient information exchange is
vital, especially given that many patients who experience an adverse event
during treatment will seek out a new physician and thus will need complete
details regarding their conditions and care for their new doctor.
Information exchange would also eliminate the many claims that are filed
just to compel the hospital or doctors to disclose information about the
patient's case, which would reduce costs imposed on the system as well as
the incidence of doctors being wrongly "punished" by having meritless
lawsuits filed against them. Also, physician-patient information exchange
is important to ensure that doctors provide the best care; patients and
families hold information vital to care (ranging from medical histories to
262 See, e.g., Liz Kowalcyzk, Hospitals Study When to Apologize to Patients, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 24, 2005, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File ("Doctors worry that if they
talk to the patient, they're more likely to be sued.").
263 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
264 It is important to provide training to medical professionals, so that they are well-equipped to
address the emotional needs of patients. See Liebman & Hyman, supra note 79, at 24 (noting that
physicians' experience in delivering bad news and discussing difficult treatment choices may be
relevant but that other skills--such as active listening skills-might need further development for
effective mediation of patients' cases); see also id. at 27-28 (on the importance of apology and
potential negative effects of partial apology); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement:
An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460, 485 (2003) (reporting empirical research in non-
medical setting finding 73% of plaintiffs likely to settle if full apology offered, as compared to 52% if
no apology offered, and only 35% if a partial apology offered).
265 By prioritizing safety promotion and information exchange, the R-MER approach requires
doctors to continue to improve their level of expertise. On the importance of incentives for increasing
physician expertise, see Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 5, at 1949-53.
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responses to current treatment).266  The R-MER process cultivates
collaboration and mutual trust, which encourages information exchange.
Finally, restorative justice models all are designed to ensure that
victims, offenders, and the community participate in, and reap the benefits
of, healing processes.267  R-MER forums likewise utilize restorative
processes that facilitate physical and emotional healing of patients, as well
as that of healthcare providers and the community.
In addition to these macro-level benefits, the R-MER model has the
potential to offer specific benefits to patients, medical professionals, and
the community.
1. Benefits for Patients
The physician-patient relationship is an inherently unbalanced one in
which power resides with the physician. Professors Nancy Neveloff
Dubler and Carol Liebman write: "The power imbalance in a hospital
setting comes from many sources: the difference in level of knowledge and
expertise between most patients and the treatment team, the highly
technical and unfamiliar physical setting, and the imperfectly allied
interests of the patient and the treatment team members. 268  An R-MER
system will help correct for some of the inherent power imbalance that
exists between the doctor-expert and the patient struggling to understand
his or her condition while simultaneously dealing with the physical,
psychological and emotional stress of serious illness or injury, by ensuring
an open dialogue between the parties and having doctors acknowledge
their mistakes. 269  The R-MER approach offers several other potential
benefits to patients: (1) an opportunity to receive an apology and further
support from physician-caregiver to facilitate emotional healing; (2) an
opportunity for continuing communication and the physician-patient
relationship, if the patient desires; (3) greater access to information; and (4)
greater assurances that his or her medical expenses will be covered in the
event of a medical error. Many of these benefits will help restore the
human elements of care and treatment.270
266 See, e.g., Patrice L. Spath, Safety from the Patient's Point of View, in PARTNERING WITH
PATIENTS TO REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS 19-21 (Patrice L. Spath ed., 2004) (discussing the value of
including patients in safety promotion).267 See supra Part V.B.
268 Nancy Neveloff Dubler & Carol B. Liebman, Bioethics: Mediating Conflict in the Hospital
Environment, Disp. RESOL. J., Jul. 2004, at 32, 36. See also Ferris, supra note 100, at 183 ("The
therapeutic relationship is complicated by its inherent imbalance of power that, in part, stems from the
one-sidedness of the physical and emotional encounters.").
269 See, e.g., Dubler & Liebman, supra note 268, at 36 ("The physical and emotional stress of
serious illness also contribute to an uneven playing field. Patients in hospitals are often very sick;
cognition, understanding, and judgment are all affected by illness. Also, families are under moderate to
extraordinary stress depending on the health status of the patient and on the trajectory of the illness.").
270 See GAWANDE, supra note 83, at 45 ("Modem care already lacks the human touch....
Patients feel like a number too often as it is."); Carole Levine, Life But No Limb: The Afiermath of
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Whereas under the current system the threat of litigation forms an
immediate barrier between the patient and his or her caregiver at the time
when injury occurs and the patient most needs care from his or her doctor,
in the R-MER system ties between the doctor and patient are not severed.
Instead, communication continues in order to uncover what went wrong
and to aid the patient's healing. With open lines of communication, a
patient can also receive an apology and other forms of support to facilitate
emotional healing. If appropriate, the care relationship itself can continue.
Similar to some mediation efforts, the R-MER approach will allow the
patient, his or her family, and the physician an opportunity "to fully
explore what happened, why it happened, and its effects on all
concerned. 27' With more open discussion of errors, patients will not have
to resort to litigation to determine what went wrong.
In the R-MER model, compensation for injury-related expenses also
can be assured to patients injured as a result of medical error.272 By
comparison, under the traditional litigation model, patients face great
uncertainty. Their situation is somewhat analogous to playing the lottery;
there is a very small chance that the patient could end up with a windfall,
but a much greater likelihood that he or she will end up with nothing.273
Perhaps even more important, litigation may go on for years, delaying
compensation and forcing the patient to bear the burden of costs and
emotional strain in the intervening years.274  Under an R-MER system,
patients would obtain compensation without having to suffer through years
of litigation, physical and emotional stress, and uncertainty.
2. Benefits for Doctors and Hospitals
While patients understandably benefit under the R-MER system,
what's in it for the doctors and hospitals? Why would doctors or hospitals
openly admit mistakes? To answer these questions, consider what doctors
(and other healthcare providers) want most: relief from soaring insurance
premiums, a supportive practice environment in which they discuss
decisions, learn from mistakes and grow professionally, and an opportunity
to serve a community without worrying that patients will sue the moment
something appears wrong. As we shall see, the R-MER system better
addresses doctors' concerns than the current medical malpractice model.
Medical Error, HEALTH AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2002, at 237, 240 (describing the "excruciating" experience
that litigation imposes upon injured patients and their family members).
271 Ferris, supra note 100, at 184.
272 See supra note 4 (discussing that "medical error" includes both individual and systems errors).
See also infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text (discussing compensation).
273 See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 24-26.
274 See supra note 49-51 and accompanying text.
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First, the R-MER system can reduce large jury awards or settlements,
the cost of which, even if it is for only a small percentage of the total
number of injured patients, can be dramatic.275 Offering one example, the
General Counsel to Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center in
Chicago highlighted the scenario facing Cook County hospitals:
In 2002 .... [t]here were 74 medical malpractice cases
that settled for a million dollars, and 19 cases settled for more
than $5 million..... .The total for medical malpractice
settlements [in Cook County] was $334 million. You cannot
take $334 million out of a jurisdiction like Cook County year
after year and have that system survive. It won't happen. It
can't happen.276
Moving to an R-MER system should dramatically reduce and possibly
eliminate the need for punitive damages, saving hospitals and insurance
companies millions of dollars. Accordingly, doctors' insurance premiums
should come down as well.77 Hospitals and insurance companies will
realize further savings from reduced litigation costs and reductions in
payouts on the non-meritorious cases that are cheaper to pay off than
litigate under the current system. 278 The cost savings alone should provide
some incentive for doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies to support a
restorative model.
In addition, hospitals, doctors, and other health care professionals will
benefit from a more open dialogue about medical errors. Improvements in
quality depend on obtaining as much information as possible about
errors. 27 9 More open dialogue would foster a better learning environment
275 See the research on the impact of apology and information exchange (or lack thereof), supra
notes 76-80 and accompanying text, and the impact of early offer approaches to medical error, supra
note 232.
276 Max Douglas Brown et al., Panel Discussion, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in
Medical Malpractice, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 249, 253 (2003). See also Mike Mclntire,
Malpractice Claims Rose Against City Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at B3, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (finding in New York City that city-run hospitals paid out $145
million in settlements and judgments in 2005).
277 See generally BAKER, supra note 39, at 93 (noting that when anesthesiologists made
improvements in standards of care, error rates dropped and so did their medical malpractice insurance
premiums). But see infra note 305 for the view that insurance cycles have a more significant effect on
medical malpractice premiums than the liability system.
278 See, for example, the University of Michigan Health System program, in which the hospital
discloses errors to patients injured by medical intervention and offers compensation immediately. See
Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of Medical Liability
Reform, 354 N. ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2207 (2006). Prior to the program's 2002 launch, the organization
averaged approximately 260 claims and lawsuits pending at any given time. Id. By August 2005, the
number was down to 114. Id. Claim resolution time was cut by over 50% and annual litigation costs
dropped from about $3 million to $1 million. Id.
279 Dauer, supra note 56, at 40 ("[Quality improvement] requires as much information about
errors and accidents as possible; the risk of tort liability tends to drive information further from the light
of investigation.").
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in which to practice, as well as to improvements in the quality of care. As
one physician notes, "[t]he paradox of modem quality improvement is that
only by admitting and forgiving error can its rate be minimized., 280 Some
scholars and selected hospitals have already recognized the value of more
open dialogue with patients and apologies. 281  Healthcare providers and
hospitals share in these benefits, along with patients.
Greater knowledge and improved practice should make the practice of
medicine more rewarding and enriching. Not having to practice under the
constant threat of malpractice litigation will minimize one of the primary
reasons for doctor dissatisfaction. Finally, by utilizing the R-MER
approach to improve skills and enhance quality of care, hospitals will be
able to present themselves to the public as offering the best care available,
providing a competitive advantage over hospitals that still rely on
traditional medical malpractice litigation to resolve disputes with patients.
To disclose or not to disclose-a closer look. The R-MER approach
depends significantly on doctors' willingness to speak openly about their
decision-making. The cost savings for physicians and hospitals (as well as
insurance companies) from reductions in compensation payments and
transaction costs should provide impetus for disclosure of errors.282
Resulting improvements in the practice environment should give
physicians further incentive to work in an R-MER system. Still, two
concerns persist in the R-MER model: (1) will doctors want to discuss
mistakes, even with all the attendant benefits, if such mistakes will be
made known to others,283 and (2) will "bad" doctors simply view the R-
MER model as an opportunity to admit mistakes and move on without
penalty?
At the outset, it bears noting that doctors are already monitored under
the current system. There are various websites that provide information
about the qualifications and performance of, and disciplinary action
280 Blumenthal, supra note 82, at 1868.
281 See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 62, at 482-83 (describing how an "early offer" approach
"would allow providers who promptly disclose injuries and promise compensation to avoid liability
claims for full tort-style damages."); Liz Kowalcyzk, supra note 262 (reporting on Harvard Medical
School's teaching hospitals consideration of new disclosure policies allowing physicians to openly
acknowledge medical errors to patients and to provide training in apologizing). See also the experience
of the VA Hospital of Lexington, KY, supra note 232, and the University of Michigan Health System,
supra note 278.
282 Some may argue that if compensation payments are tied to determinations that mistakes were
made, some doctors and hospitals may still have some incentive not to disclose errors. This tension
may suggest a move to offering compensation in all bad outcome cases. Alternatively, it may be that
R-MER provides significant other incentives for both short- and long-term financial gain, such that the
incentive to disclose is sufficient. This tension cannot be resolved here in the abstract but merits
continued monitoring to ensure the success of R-MER models.
283 Arguably, other factors beyond the threat of litigation-such as pride and fear of being shamed
in front of colleagues or in the public eye--contribute to doctors' reluctance to admit mistakes.
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against, doctors and hospitals.8 4 In addition, under the current system,
even if doctors settle out of court such that no record of malpractice shows
on their record, by law such settlements must be reported to the National
Practitioners Data Bank (Data Bank).285 Although the Data Bank is not
available to the general public, it is accessible by hospitals considering the
granting or withholding of hospital privileges as well as other entities that
monitor doctors' performance.
The question of how much of an R-MER system's records should be
made public is an important issue. Certain restorative models, such as
truth commissions, suggest that as a general rule more public disclosure is
better. In the medical setting, disclosure might provide patients with an
increased sense of procedural fairness, provide incentives for doctors and
hospitals to take corrective action to reduce errors, and avoid the
inherently suspicious nature of confidential proceedings. That said, public,
and in particular media, access to R-MER forums is likely to significantly
alter healthcare providers' approach to such processes. One of the
advantages of mediation, which is confidential, is that dialogue can occur
without each party having to worry about strategic considerations.28 6 Thus,
while there may be potential benefits to public disclosure, on balance, R-
MER models are likely to achieve greater success if they are confidential.
Confidentiality is likely to foster conditions more conducive to disclosure.
In order to mitigate the mistrust that might be caused by confidential
proceedings, "independent observers" could attend R-MER sessions, to
ensure impartial review of cases and provide limited reports to the public
that do not disclose information which the parties want confidential.
The issue of disclosure merits careful consideration, and it is discussed
further below in the TIM Commission setting.28 7 However, two additional
points are worth noting. First, the correct comparison is not zero public
disclosure in the traditional litigation context versus disclosure under the
R-MER model. As described above, there is limited disclosure already
through the Data Bank and various websites. Moreover, newspapers report
on doctors and hospitals that are sued for malpractice in certain cases,
suggesting that doctors who make errors are often already subjected to
some public scrutiny and shaming. Importantly, under the current system,
this may occur when the physician has done nothing wrong (but is sued
because the patient feels the doctor or hospital is not forthcoming). Under
284 See, e.g., New York State Physician Profile, http://www.nydoctorprofile.com (last visited Oct.
29, 2006); American Board of Medical Specialties Home Page, http://www.abms.org/ (last visited Oct.
29, 2006); Federation of State Medical Boards, http://www.docinfo.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2006);
HealthGrades: Information on Hospitals, Doctors, and Nursing Homes, http://www.healthgrades.com/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
285 See The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11131-34 (2000)
(establishing that any payment made on behalf of a physician be reported to the Data Bank).
286 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
287 See infra Part VI.B.
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R-MER schemes, disclosure would be limited and would occur only after
determinations had been made with respect to error, if any, and steps to be
taken to improve practices. This would eliminate the incidence of doctors
being improperly "punished" by bad publicity from meritless cases.
Second, the R-MER model provides other benefits for physicians that,
I believe, in the aggregate exceed in value the cost of admitting a mistake.
These benefits include reduced insurance premiums, reduced threat of
protracted litigation and being wrongly "punished" by information-
gathering lawsuits, an opportunity to practice in an environment where
colleagues can discuss more openly their practices (and errors) and learn
from each other, and an opportunity to "make amends" by participating in
the patient's healing through an apology, empathy and other emotional
support, and continued care (if acceptable to the patient). Further,
assuming there is some limited disclosure of errors, it could be designed in
a way that protects individual healthcare providers. The R-MER system
could also ensure that such disclosure is coupled with positive disclosure
regarding steps taken (or to be taken) by doctors and hospitals to improve
practices. This positive disclosure would help offset negative press from
errors. Follow-up monitoring confirming improvements in practice would
further off-set any initial negative publicity.
The other concern, which raises the specter of "bad" doctors using R-
MER forums to absolve themselves of responsibility and continue reckless
practices, seems unlikely to be an issue for the vast majority of doctors
who take pride in their work. Moreover, R-MER forums aim to focus the
dialogue on accepting responsibility for what has occurred, not simply
288conceding errors. In other words, apologies are not sufficient by
themselves. They must be accompanied with some form of reparations,
which can include both material and non-material components, and
agreement on recommendations for future practice. Recommendations
might include additional training for the physicians involved in the case.
This process will not permit "bad" doctors simply to say "sorry" and move
on. In addition, for the small number of doctors who might try to abuse the
system, hospitals (and possibly even state licensing boards) might take it
upon themselves to police doctors who repeatedly find themselves
participating in R-MER proceedings because they repeat the same errors.
Finally, if records are made public in a limited way, market pressures
might have some effect because patients will be reluctant to visit hospitals
with poor records.289
288 See PAVLICH, supra note 187, at 68 (describing the goal of a restorative justice system to
"focus especially on what offenders can do to 'put things right' with victims and communities").
28 It is feasible that an R-MER system, with its open discussion of practices (and errors), could
produce a better method of evaluating doctors than malpractice liability determinations offer.
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3. Benefits for the Community
Ultimately, the community also benefits from an approach that is less
adversarial and more focused on healing and restoration. The more open
approach should help to restore the community's trust and faith in the
health care system. Professor Mark Hall writes: "Without some minimal
level of trust, patients would not seek care, submit to treatment, disclose
necessary information, or follow treatment recommendations. ' 290 When
patients are more trusting, they will seek care earlier and be more open
with their doctors. This should enable doctors to diagnose problems earlier
and help prevent more serious injuries, which will reduce both bad
outcomes and health care costs. Reducing insurance premiums will also
help to reduce the overall cost of health care, an industry that currently is
burdened by overwhelming costs. These cost savings could be used to
provide care for those who currently do not have insurance or to improve
care offered to the public generally. Finally, improvements in standards of
care will mean fewer errors and better outcomes for the community.
B. A Model-Truth-in-Medicine Commission
There are a range of possible structures for an R-MER system. Here, I
offer one possible variation: a Truth-in-Medicine (TIM) Commission. The
purpose of putting forth this model is to provide an example of how
restorative justice might play out in a medical setting. A comprehensive
discussion of any model would necessarily include detailed economic
modeling and other analyses which are beyond the scope of this Article.
The TIM Commission, however, can offer a starting point for a dialogue
on developing an R-MER system.
A TIM Commission would draw upon principles of mediation and
enterprise liability but would supplement them with additional restorative
components. As with any R-MER system, the central component of a TIM
Commission is a participatory forum for parties affected by a medical
error. There are two plausible starting points. A TIM Commission could
serve an individual hospital or an existing or newly-created consortium of
health care facilities. The former approach builds upon enterprise liability
models but, unlike a solely internal-review process contemplated under
enterprise liability, a TIM Commission system would be semi-autonomous
and include participation by TIM Commission members. The second
option, having the TIM Commission serve a consortium of hospitals,
would further the independence of panels and facilitate sharing of
knowledge regarding errors and best practices among hospitals in a
290 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 478 (2002).
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consortium, and thus has greater hope of achieving the goals of the
healing-centered framework.291
In either case, each forum would include the participation of TIM
Commission members. Commission members might include medical
doctors with specialty expertise, general practitioners, nurses and other
allied health professionals, medical malpractice attorneys, insurance
experts, and community representatives. TIM Commission members
would be trained to manage and facilitate restorative processes (not unlike
certain training for mediators).292 They would facilitate resolutions, not
decide cases. The participation of impartial individuals is essential for
addressing the inherent power imbalance between healthcare providers and
patients, ensuring the integrity of the system, protecting against special
interest-dictated outcomes, and restoring trust among patients, doctors, and
hospitals. The broad-based representation in the pool of TIM Commission
members would ensure that all key constituents, particularly the
community as representative of patients, would have a voice in the process.
TIM Commission members would also play a second key role. Not
only would they help facilitate a resolution involving the particular patient
and healthcare providers, they would also assist in developing
recommendations for steps to address individual and/or systems errors.
TIM Commissions would also collaborate with facilities on follow-up
monitoring of the implementation of agreed-upon recommendations. This
recommendation and follow-up monitoring function can help fulfill the
safety promotion objective of the healing-centered framework. To the
extent there is limited disclosure of TIM Commission proceedings, the
prospect of a favorable follow-up report offers positive incentive for
doctors to improve their skills and hospitals to improve their systems.
TIM Commission review of a case could be triggered two ways: a
patient could request a review following an adverse outcome; and doctors
291 If pilot R-MER models are successful, they could be expanded to state-wide approaches, given
that medical malpractice historically has been a state law issue, or the federal government could
develop a national system. See Sage, supra note 56, at 20 (suggesting that the federal government can
always propose reforms for claims involving Medicare and Medicaid patients, "which could then set
the standard for the rest of the health care system").
292 Training of TIM Commission members is essential, as is working with physicians and
hospitals to help ensure that they communicate effectively with patients. See CAROL B. LIEBMAN &
CHRIS STERN HYMAN, MEDICAL ERROR DISCLOSURE, MEDIATION SKILLS, AND MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION: A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT IN PENNSYLVANIA 22 (2005), available at http://www.pew
trusts.org/ideas/ (in the drop box, follow "Medical liability" hyperlink; then follow "Grantee Reports"
hyperlink; then follow "Medical Error Disclosure" hyperlink; then again follow "Medical Error
Disclosure" hyperlink); DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 140, at 9; BERLINGER, supra note 232, at 92-
113 (providing recommendations for physicians and hospital practices that would support an R-MER
approach).
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would report any medical error.293 The TIM Commission panel members
assigned to that case would review medical reports and facilitate a dialogue
between the parties to reach a determination regarding the case.294 The
goal would be to obtain a full and open accounting of the events that
caused the injury, agree upon appropriate compensation, if any, for the
injured patient, and develop recommendations to improve practices and
standards of care. Follow-up assessments of progress and effectiveness of
steps undertaken would also constitute an important element of the
process.295
For patients, the TIM Commission would provide a forum to gain
access to information necessary to understand what happened as well as an
apology from doctors, thereby reducing harm. It would also offer patients
the opportunity to restore their relationship with their doctor, if desired,
and their faith in the health care system generally. The TIM Commission's
more collaborative process would also be much quicker than pursuing
litigation claims that may take years before reaching trial, let alone a final
judgment. The TIM Commission might be required to review cases and
make determinations within a certain number of days and, if compensation
is merited, require it to be paid shortly after final determinations are made
in cases.296  This would help patients avoid prolonged suffering.
293 As the research shows that most patients injured as a result of medical error do not file a claim,
it is vital that doctors report errors in order to achieve the optimal results in terms of error reduction. It
is worth noting that doctors already are required to disclose certain errors to patients by the American
Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics and the U.S. Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS wrrH ANNOTATIONS § 8.12 (1997); JCAHO, COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (2004). Several states also have
mandatory disclosure laws. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.1051 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 439.855 (LexisNexis 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.25 (West Supp. 2006); 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1303.308(b) (2004). The benefits of the TIM Commission for doctors should help
incentivize disclosure of errors.
294 Submitting to a TIM Commission would not require waiving one's right to access the courts.
Forcing participants to waive their right to sue might make the TIM Commission process too similar to
those mandatory arbitration clauses that have not been upheld by the courts. See supra note 146 and
accompanying text. That said, building in incentives to accept fair early offers might help ensure the
success of the TIM Commission model. See, e.g., Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake:
Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 93-94 (2005) (proposing a model whereby, following
an admission of fault and offer of fair compensation by the healthcare provider, the injured party who
rejects the offer would receive the lesser of the offer or the verdict and would be responsible for
litigation costs incurred by the healthcare provider, if the verdict were within 12% of the early offer).
295 This follow-up assessment function has parallels in a range of fields, such as corporate and
environmental audit practices. For an examination of the ability of various liability schemes to create
incentives for enterprises to monitor and improve employee practices in the corporate context, see, for
example, Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687 (1997). One question regarding the TIM
Commission model is whether it would require a large bureaucracy. This is a legitimate concern and
not the intention of this model, and thus merits further monitoring. Mediation practice offers some
guidance for avoiding big bureaucracy. Thus, although the TIM Commission's recommendation and
follow-up component would require greater organization, it can be built on some existing structures and
otherwise designed to minimize bureaucracy.296 See supra note 232.
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Moreover, participation in the process should help both doctors and
patients feel more satisfied with the outcome.
An R-MER approach is not necessarily a no-fault system; it does not
need to guarantee compensation. Ideally it should cover injuries suffered
as a result of individual or systems errors, or at least those injuries caused
by negligent acts. In the latter scenario, patients who suffer an adverse
outcome through no fault of the doctors would not necessarily receive
compensation. The other healing and restorative elements of the R-MER
forum still would provide benefits to those patients. On the other hand,
guaranteeing compensation for all patients regardless of fault would make
it easier for patients; however, it would also increase the funding needed to
support a TIM Commission. 297 Further research is needed to evaluate the
cost and impact of each of these options and determine the optimal
approach to the compensation component of a TIM Commission. Overall,
a TIM Commission could help achieve the goals of more equitable
compensation, safety promotion, harm reduction, information exchange,
and restoration.
Assuming the TIM Commission did not operate on a strict liability
basis, why would doctors or hospitals want to disclose errors? In the TIM
Commission setting, a doctor deemed to have offered a full and open
accounting of the case could be "rewarded" in some way, such as
protection from individual liability or an opportunity to have the case
removed from his or her record subsequently if appropriate improvements
are made in practice. This would help provide an incentive for healthcare
providers to improve their expertise, furthering safety promotion.
Hospitals could also receive some insurance-related benefits by complying
with requirements for disclosure of errors and early and adequate
compensation offers to patients.
Longer-term, hospitals would realize lower insurance premiums
because their error rates and payments to injured patients would go down.
Also, any negative effects resulting from a TIM Commission determination
that errors were made could be alleviated, at least in part, by publicizing
subsequent determinations that commend physicians and hospitals for
improvements in practices. Moreover, in determining the cause of the
injury, because the doctor and hospital accept responsibility for errors and
agree to work to implement recommendations for improving practice and
avoiding additional errors, the need for punitive damages would be
dramatically reduced, if not eliminated altogether, in most cases.
Accordingly, medical professionals, hospitals, and insurance companies
would realize significant benefits in reduced compensation paid out, as
297 Funding needed to support the TIM Commission may increase, but overall costs of health care
may not. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
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well as significant reductions in costs normally allocated to defending
cases for years in the courts. In the short-term, some of this gain
admittedly would be offset by payments to a larger pool of patients-
including those currently going without compensation under the current
system. However, the TIM Commission would achieve improved
practices and lower error rates in the long-term, resulting in long-term cost
savings.
The question remains: where would the money used to compensate
patients come from? In restorative justice models, compensation typically
comes from a common fund or from restitution payments. In the TIM
Commission context, funding could be hospital-based, with insurance
coverage, or could come at least in part from a joint compensation fund if
TIM Commissions cover more than one hospital. Doctors (through
insurance premiums), hospitals, and insurance companies could contribute
to this fund. The savings achieved through avoiding large jury awards
(recall, Cook County incurred $334 million in settlement award costs in
2002)298 and not having to incur high costs in protracted litigation or payoff
meritless claims should provide a substantial amount of money for the
compensation fund.299  Also, as mentioned above, long-term savings
through error reduction would reduce payments made either out of a fund,
or by hospitals and insurance companies. Overall, the cost savings appear
significant, especially in the long-run, and thus hospitals and insurance
companies should have incentive for supporting an R-MER system. 300 As
discussed above, precise details on funding of the compensation
component of the R-MER system would require comprehensive economic
modeling, which is beyond the scope of this Article but, I submit, is worth
pursuing.
In the long run, patients would view hospital systems that have TIM
Commission as ones that are more attentive to the needs of patients, are
open regarding patient care, and provide the best care available, given that
those facilities are continually reviewing and improving practices. Doctors
and other healthcare providers would come to see that an R-MER system is
a better environment in which to work. Hospitals would achieve a
competitive advantage in care offered, as well as reduced costs. TIM
Commission hospitals could have the additional benefit of ultimately
attracting the top doctors with their better working environments, further
improving care and increasing their competitive advantage over hospitals
still using the traditional litigation-based model. Finally, the community
would benefit from restored trust, improved care, and reductions in health
care expenditures.
29s See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 277.
300 See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39:667
REFRAMING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
C. Further Considerations
1. Implications for Tort Law Generally
The potential benefits of the R-MER approach to medical malpractice
raise questions whether such a model could be applied successfully to
other aspects of the health field, or even more broadly to other areas of tort
law.
A full exploration of the effectiveness of an R-MER model in other
areas of tort law is beyond the scope of this Article, however it is worth
noting that there are unique aspects of the physician-patient relationship
which suggest that the R-MER approach is perhaps most appropriately
suited to addressing medical practice.30 1 First, the treatment relationship is
ultimately about care and relies on a level of trust and intimacy typically
not present in many other interactions governed by tort law. As such, the
healing aspects of an R-MER system most readily fit with the care
relationship that arises in medical practice. In addition, there are different
incentive structures in direct patient care as opposed to the manufacturing
of pharmaceuticals or medical devices, let alone with automobile
manufacturers, oil companies, and other global businesses. An R-MER
system dramatically reduces the need for punitive damages. While
hospitals clearly run as businesses today, their direct contact with patients
makes them somewhat different from large manufacturers of drugs,
medical devices, or other non-medical products.30 2 In recent years, we
have seen examples of manufacturers making cost-benefit decisions that
put profits before people.30 3 Reducing the prospect of punitive damages in
those cases might eliminate the only deterrent to such actions. Thus, given
that revenues in today's world often are calculated in billions, we need to
proceed cautiously before removing any counter-balancing protections in
place for individuals. Having said that, the goal of healing found in
restorative justice efforts is a worthwhile endeavor and as such its potential
application to other areas of health care and tort law should not be rejected
without further consideration.
301 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 23, at 306-07 (noting that traditional tort law theories developed in
response to accidents between strangers).
302 For example, pursuant to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), hospitals with emergency departments are required to treat and stabilize patients deemed
to have emergency medical conditions, irrespective of patients' ability to pay. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd
(West 2006). By contrast, private corporations generally are not required to give away their products
and services to those who are unable to pay.
303 Huge verdicts against General Motors in the 1990s and the infamous Ford Pinto case of the
1970s provide two examples. For more on these cases and cost-benefit analyses, see generally
Geistfeld, supra note 29.
304 In the personal injury context, at least one company-Toro Company, a manufacturer of lawn
care products-has realized significant benefits from moving from a litigation model toward a
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2. The Insurance Industry's Role Revisited
Given the prominent role of the insurance industry in U.S. health care,
it is fair to ask where insurance fits in an R-MER model centered on the
physician-patient relationship. Liability insurance issues have played a key
role in the medical malpractice crises of recent decades.30 5 Clearly, the
insurance industry has to play a role, most notably in developing and
supporting the compensation component of R-MER systems. Under the R-
MER system, the insurance industry can also contribute to safety
promotion and harm reduction.
First, assuming that initially TIM Commissions would be situated
within hospitals or consortia of hospitals, insurance companies could help
spread learning by requiring other hospitals or consortia to adopt "new"
practices to qualify for lower insurance premiums. In addition, by
contributing to efficient resolution of cases, the insurance industry can help
minimize suffering. In return, an R-MER system should help reduce the
incidence of error (number of payouts) and excessive compensation awards
(amounts of payouts), providing benefits to the insurance industry. The
role of the insurance industry requires additional exploration. Insurance
companies will play a key role and that role, if properly designed and
managed, can contribute to a healing and restorative model.30 6
3. R-MER's Affordability
Any proposal for an alternative approach to remedying injuries
suffered as a result of medical error will be met with questions as to
affordability of the new system. In addition to the cost benefits associated
with an R-MER model identified above, three additional observations are
worth mention.
First, I must concede that cries of "it's too expensive" sound a bit like
statements that eating healthy is too expensive (or at least much more
collaborative approach, settling claims more rapidly and for far less cost. See Cohen, supra note 232,
at 1460-61 (Toro responds to claims by offering to mediate, and in mediation provides information,
expresses empathy (but does not admit fault), and makes what it believes is a fair settlement offer. The
results are that its average claim resolution time has dropped from twenty-four to four months, average
payout per claim dropped from $68,368 to $18,594, and average costs and fees per claim dropped from
$47,252 to $12,023. Insurance premiums dropped so significantly that ultimately Toro elected to self-
insure. Overall, Toro estimates that by 1999 it had saved over $75 million since adopting the new
approach in 1991).
303 Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
393 (2005); William Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and The Emperor's Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 463, 469-70 (2005). See also Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio),
Stupid: Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform,
108 PENN ST. L. REV 1077, 1078 (2004) (suggesting that medical malpractice crises are largely a result
of cyclical insurance crises due to bond market fluctuations).
306 Concerns may exist that the insurance industry cares only about the bottom line and thus will
support restorative aspects on the doctor/hospital side that reduce costs, but will not support restorative
measures that benefit patients. Further development of the insurance industry's role in R-MER system
is vital to resolving these issues.
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costly than fast food). In fact, it is unclear that eating healthier is more
expensive, and substantial evidence supports the position that a healthy
diet is affordable (and helps prevent long-term ailments and costs). 30
7
Similarly, an R-MER scheme can be crafted to provide cost savings that
can offset a substantial portion, if not the entire amount, of any increases in
expenditures resulting from the new system.
308
Second, when considering the "cost" of various medical malpractice
liability systems, it is important to be clear about the "costs" to which we
refer. It is fair to argue that certain alternatives--e.g., no-fault liability-
may cost more than the tort liability system. That cost, however, refers to
the costs imposed on healthcare providers and facilities. Total payouts by
a hospital may increase as a result of switching to a no-fault system.
However, under the tort liability system, uncompensated injured
individuals still impose costs on the healthcare system (e.g., costs of
additional treatment needed as a result of being injured by error), and on
society in general (e.g., absenteeism, lost wages, increased reliance on
social welfare programs, etc.). 309 In other words, the "lower costs" of one
approach may result in savings for certain entities and providers but it does
not necessarily mean cost savings for the health care system or for society
as a whole. In developing an effective response to medical error, it is
important to consider overall costs of health care, not merely compensation
payments.
Third, let us assume for the moment that a restorative approach would
cost more, but would provide more equitable compensation for injured
patients, emotional healing for patients and healthcare providers,
opportunities for healthcare providers to improve skills and systems, better
care for the community, and a reduction in medical errors. I submit that
307 See, e.g., Pat Kendall, Colo. St. Univ., Eating Healthy on a Budget, available at
http://cetuolumne.ucdavis.edu/newsletterfiles/HomeAdvisorArticles_20057101.doc (last visited
Nov. 25, 2006) (finding that the cost of eating healthy for an entire day is "less than the cost of a typical
meal at a fast-food restaurant"); Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Cent., Nutrition Services, Eating Healthy on
a Budget, http://nutritionservices.upmc.com/NutritionArticles/Habits/Budget.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2006) ("It's a common misconception that cutting back on food expenses means sacrificing good
nutrition.").
308 Costs savings could be achieved for doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies in the
following areas: reductions in large jury verdicts, reduced pain and suffering awards, fewer payouts in
"bad" cases where no wrongdoing occurred but it is cheaper to settle than litigate, reductions in
expenses defending lawsuits, and long-term fewer errors and thus fewer injured patients seeking
compensation. The economic modeling necessary to determine the total value of such savings is
beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, pure cost comparisons would not recognize the R-MER
system's most significant value-providing healing for patients, doctors, and the community.
" On the costs of accidents and injury, see, for example, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of
Accidents, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw 155, 155-76 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 2d ed. 1983); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 314 (1987).
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most people would support such a system, even if it costs more than the
current, poorly-functioning system. In their daily lives, people frequently
make choices to spend more than the minimum because they believe that
the better return is worth the incremental investment. 310 Health care is an
area in which that choice also makes sense.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent decades, the medical profession finds itself almost
perpetually in a state of crisis. There are deep-seated problems with the
current medical malpractice liability system, and current reforms have little
hope of breaking us out of this cycle. A genuine solution requires a
comprehensive approach to the problem. The healing-centered framework
set forth in this Article takes the important first step of reorienting our
priorities toward a set of objectives that will achieve optimal results for
patients, healthcare providers, and communities. Drawing upon restorative
justice principles, the R-MER model offers hope that the law can provide
healing, consistent with both the goals of medicine and the healing-
centered framework. The R-MER system has the potential to mend
physician-patient relationships, restore mutual trust, improve patient
compensation, foster a medical culture in which healthcare providers learn
from mistakes and improve practices, minimize harm and suffering,
facilitate information exchange, provide healing, and improve the overall
quality of care provided in this country.
Faced with recurrent medical malpractice crises, we would do well to
recall the words of Albert Einstein:
The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its
solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or
experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities,
to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative
imagination and marks real advance. 1
While it would be obvious hyperbole to suggest that ideas for medical
malpractice reform rival the discoveries of Einstein, the critical insight
remains the same: the right questions are necessary in order to find the
right answers. In the context of medical malpractice, the fundamental
310 Post-September I 1th, Americans have consistently agreed that they would be willing to pay
more for various means of transportation in exchange for greater security. See, e.g., Fabrizio,
McLaughlin & Associates, Opinion Poll (Sept. 17-20, 2001) (on file with Connecticut Law Review)
(finding 79% of Americans willing to pay higher airline ticket taxes to pay for increased security on
flights). See also Geistfeld, supra note 29, at 118-19 (explaining how the "precautionary principle" in
international environmental law creates a dynamic whereby "cost considerations [are] of secondary
importance").
311 ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS: THE GROWTH OF IDEAS
FROM EARLY CONCEPTS TO RELATIVITY AND QUANTA 95 (1938).
[Vol. 39:667
2006] REFRAMING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM 737
question is how to create a system for addressing medical errors that is
based on the principle of care and provides healing for patients, doctors,
and the community. The healing-centered framework and restorative
medical error resolution system may be the first steps toward the right
answers.

